

The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XXIX

NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1922

NUMBER 376

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The Week

WHEN Secretary Hughes rang down the curtain on the final scene of the Washington Conference, the delegates were no doubt justified in stepping down into the auditorium and vigorously applauding the happy ending of their play. The Washington Conference and the Irish settlement between them are indicative of a significant political and moral recovery from the anarchy and disorder into which the Great War plunged the world. President Harding and Secretary Hughes have managed to do away with the immediate causes of international friction between the United States and both Japan and Great Britain, to limit naval armaments by agreement and somewhat to improve the position of China. They and their associates in the Conference are entitled to congratulations for these substantial achievements. But congratulations should not provide any excuse for complacency. These achievements are only beginnings. They are admirable if they are followed up. But if they are not followed up, if they are treated as a settlement rather than as a significant advance in a promising direction their benefits will prove to be in the end illusory.

IN our opinion the treaties framed by the Conference deserve to be ratified without any reservations or modifications. They all form part of a complicated bargain which brings with it certain immediate advantages. But in ratifying this bargain neither the Senate nor the American people should deceive themselves as to its effect. The treaties leave Japan in complete and practically unassailable naval and military control of the Far Eastern waters, islands and maritime provinces. Japan has made certain concessions to China of which the most important is the withdrawal from Shantung, but the Shantung withdrawal has a string attached to it for five years and in other respects she retains all her existing possessions and privileges. She is perfectly frank about her intention of dominating China in the future. As Ambassador Shidehara said: "With hundreds of thousands of our nationals resident in China, with enormous amounts of our capital invested there, and with our national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally interested in that country to a greater extent than the countries more remotely situated." This is a perfectly clear announcement that the Japanese consider themselves entitled as a matter of "national existence" to be as much interested in China as are not only the Americans but as are the Chinese themselves. It means that the Japanese government proposes to use the naval and military domination of the Far East which it obtains under the new treaties for the purpose of the economic and political subjection of China.

IF this interpretation of Ambassador Shidehara's words is correct, the naval agreement may seem equivalent to an abandonment of China by the United States. It may look as if through an aperture in the screen of fine phrases of the last plenary session, an observer could detect the grinning mouth and the gleaming teeth of the victorious dragon of Japanese imperialism. But it would be premature to jump from the interpretation to the

conclusion. No doubt the Japanese imperialists are congratulating themselves upon the winning of a great victory in Washington. They hope that they have cleared the way for Japanese economic penetration and subjugation of China. But they are counting upon a continuation in the future of two important conditions which have favored them in the past. They expect China to persist in being incapable of resistance, and they expect the prevalence of a standard of international financial and political behavior, sympathetic to their enterprise. Neither expectation will, we believe, be fulfilled. Chinese national resistance will increase, and Japan will find herself increasingly isolated in a world which will cease to connive at the economic and political exploitation of one people by another.

IN the negotiations between France and England over their proposed defensive compact, the French asked that the Rhineland be included in the compact and that Britain should bind herself to military action in certain eventualities. If, for instance, Germany were to dispatch troops into the Rhineland, that would constitute an act of war against both France and Britain, under the proposed compact. This arrangement the British refused to undertake, for two reasons. One was that under it Britain might find herself automatically at war over matters where a reasonable interpretation of the facts would offer a peaceable solution. Suppose that a condition of disorder developed in the Rhine valley which the German government could cope with only through the use of an armed gendarmerie. If the German government sent such armed forces into the region, she would have committed an act which under the proposed compact would justify France in demanding that England join her in making war on Germany. The second reason the British offer for rejecting the proposal is of more direct interest to America. If they were to accept it, they point out, Britain alone would assume an obligation that under the Treaty of Versailles rested on all the Allies. Does that mean that if we had ratified the Treaty we might have been dragged into war automatically, over matters quite susceptible of a peaceable solution? It does. It is specifically stated in the Treaty that certain acts of Germany in the Rhineland would constitute acts of war against all the Allied and Associated powers. And if Germany did things that, however innocuous in themselves, were defined in a treaty to which America was a party, as acts of war against America, should we not be at war with Germany? Thanks to our failure to ratify, the dangerous and imperialistic Rhine policy of the

French will have to be modified, at least so far as may be necessary to insure British support.

THE account which Mr. George Glasgow gives in another column of the objects which Mr. Lloyd George had in mind when he proposed the Genoa Conference is peculiarly interesting in relation to the future international organization of Europe. The Lloyd George proposal involves, according to Mr. Glasgow, "the virtual end of the Supreme Council as the deciding executive authority in post-war Europe and the abdication of its authority to a European Conference at which Germans and Russians will sit as equals among equals." If this is true, if the Genoa Conference is really intended to become a better substitute for the Supreme Council and the forerunner of a European Concert, its importance in European history may be analogous to that of the Congress which framed the Treaty of Westphalia. The Supreme Council has since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles acted as the government of Europe, but it was a government forced on the vanquished by the victors for the victors' benefit. The addition of Germany and Russia to the Supreme Council will do more than enlarge the membership of that body. The enlargement will be equivalent to a new birth. The purpose of the new government will necessarily be the resettlement of Europe on a foundation not of arbitrary force and exclusive interest but on a foundation of consent and mutual adjustment.

EXTREMELY interesting in this connection is Mr. Glasgow's account of why Mr. Lloyd George ignored the League of Nations in planning the Genoa Conference. That he acted from persuasive reasons in so doing is indicated by the significant attitude of the French government towards this aspect of the Lloyd George plan. The French Foreign Office, it seems, is aggrieved because the League of Nations was not placed in charge of the Genoa Conference and has decided not to consent to any organization of the Conference which by ignoring the League will tend to diminish its prestige. The motive for this touching faith and interest in the League of Nations on the part of that eminent internationalist M. Poincaré is revealed by a correspondent of the New York Times. As he understands it, "the very fact that the Conference was being held under the aegis of the League would provide in the French opinion a guarantee that existing treaties would be respected and that the discussion would be kept strictly to the agenda and not allowed to degenerate into what the French constantly fear—an attempt by Germany and Rus-

sia to revise the Treaty of Versailles." Or in the words of M. Viviani "Are we (the French) going to subscribe to an insult to the only democratic international assembly? Have we forgotten that the League solved the problem of Upper Silesia and is the guardian of the peace treaties?" No, neither M. Poincaré nor M. Viviani have forgotten this important function of the League. They have divined that Mr. Lloyd George proposes "to kill the League because it seems to him completely animated by the Latin spirit."

SURELY this attempt of M. Poincaré to use the League of Nations as an excuse to emasculate the Genoa Conference is one of the most ironical enterprises in the history of diplomacy. Mr. Lloyd George proposed a conference to which Russia and Germany should be invited as equals for the purpose of substituting conference and consent for force as the instrument of European international government. He did not use the League of Nations for the purpose because the League, omitting as it did Russia and Germany, placed unnecessary obstacles in the way of the formation of an immediate or an early European Concert. But political opponents at home, such as Viscount Grey, denounce him for ignoring the League on the ground that he is discrediting the only existing agency of international government, and this denunciation is echoed by the very people in France who form the most malignant and irreconcilable obstacles to internationalism which now exists in the world. It follows, we think, that statesmen like Viscount Grey are making a grave mistake in trying to discredit the Genoa Conference in the interest of the League of Nations. They are showing more solicitude for the League as an institution than they are for the objects which the League was intended to serve. At present it is clear that a conference which is not bound by the constitution of the League and which cannot be praised as the guardian of the peace treaties and as an embodiment of the "Latin spirit" can make more headway towards international appeasement and readjustment than can the existing League.

THE passage of the bill for the refunding of the Allied debts brings us no nearer to a solution of the problem. These debts, Congress has declared, must bear not less than four and one-half percent interest and must be paid within twenty-five years. And a commission is to negotiate with the debtor nations on the ways of getting this done. Now, the bald fact is that these debts will not be paid off in twenty-five years. Interest at four and

one-half percent will not be paid, currently, and if it is made to accumulate on the books, it will presently amount to a sum so huge that it could never be paid in any circumstances. Secretary Mellon estimates that eighty percent of the debt can be paid. That is to admit at least twenty percent water in the Allied debt assets, twenty percent that will never be paid, although Congress says it must be. Besides, one half of the remaining eighty percent represents our claims upon France and Italy, whose payment is conditioned upon an improvement in fiscal conditions which no intelligent man expects to see in his life time. Does Congress propose to unload these bogus assets upon the innocent American investor? And shall we have a grand "Save till it hurts" campaign, with a new sedition bill to stop the mouths of those who would tell the truth, that most of these refunding bonds will be entirely worthless?

IT appears highly probable that the soldiers' bonus will be forced through Congress, in spite of the open disapproval of the administration and, we believe, the secret disapproval of most of the members of Congress. A determined minority, well distributed through the doubtful election districts, can get about anything it wants under our form of government. And the ex-service men constitute just such a determined minority. They feel that they are demanding what is plainly their right. While they were in the service they lost valuable opportunities for earning money and establishing themselves in their jobs. Their military pay was inadequate compensation for such losses. What they are demanding now is nothing more than simple indemnification of losses, such as anyone would demand if his property had been appropriated to government uses without adequate payment. Where is the flaw in the argument? If there is any, it must lie in the fact that there is no close analogy between military service and the furnishing of supplies to the government. There is a closer analogy between military service and the payment of taxes. The position of the ex-service man is less favorable than it would have been if there had been no war. The same thing is true of the position of the taxpayer. The government cannot indemnify everybody for his war losses, for the simple reason that the losses are there to be borne. Is it anything more than sentimentalism that insists that the ex-service men, although restored to civil life in good health and fitness for life superior to the average, should be treated as a class apart, to be indemnified for war costs no heavier than those which other citizens are expected to bear without flinching?

IF the claims of the ex-service men are just, there is little force in the plea that they should not be pressed at the present time, when it is hard for the Treasury to make ends meet. We should not have the face the urge the railways, for example, to refrain from pressing just claims for services furnished to the government. Say that the bonus will cost a billion and a half; America can find the sum, if it must. These are hard times, but the private incomes of the American people must amount to something like fifty billions. More of that is taken in taxes than is easily borne, but if an additional three percent of our incomes were taken, we should still be less heavily burdened than the citizens of any other great nation. There remains a good deal to be said as to the form of the tax. Shall we raise the billion and a half by a tax on goods sold for consumption? It is doubtful that any tax law could be so administered as to reach more than twenty billions of our national expenditure, and this volume would have to pay a tax of seven and one-half percent to raise the required sum. The cost of living would be forced up in even greater measure; something the public would not take kindly to, at the present juncture. Shall we try a lighter tax on the turnover? That would affect the cost of living still more seriously. So far as we can see the only scheme of taxation that will meet the bonus requirement without producing great political discontent is a combination of profits and luxury taxes. Restore the excess profits tax, the taxes on amusements, soft drinks, tobacco. These will not be popular taxes, but they will cost fewer votes than any others.

THE President, by appointing Senator Kenyon judge in one of the Circuit Courts, has kidnapped the leader of the agricultural "bloc" in the Senate. Feelings about this skilful raid vary. They range from accusations, by the Democrats, of cunning administration plots against the "bloc," from resentment at Senator Kenyon's readiness to accept the job, to the greeting of Senator Borah with "Good morning, Judge." Yet why blame the President for scuttling the farmer's ship, since Senator Kenyon, as its skipper, has gone ashore of his own free will? But the fight for the farmers is by no means over. Why then did he abandon it? There are a number of explanations: because he knows how rare are good judges, and how needed, and is keen to be added to their small number; because he thought as much has been done for the farmer as could be; because of a not unnatural distaste and weariness with a body so cynical as to let in

Newberry. Altogether it is disappointing. The kind of Republican who votes against Newberry can ill be spared from the Senate.

WHO is to succeed Senator Kenyon? Just now the betting seems to be on Mr. J. R. Howard, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation. Last week we reported the current suspicion that this Federation aims at the organization of a rural privileged class which could be counted on to work with Chambers of Commerce, manufacturers and business men in fighting, not only the genuine farmers' movements but labor as well. This suspicion seems to have been well-founded. Senator La Follette has brought to the notice of the Senate a memorandum of a private conference, held in Washington on December 9th, 1921, between railroad executives and the representatives of such bodies as the National Coal Association, United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. The Farm Bureau Federation was there in force, including Mr. J. R. Howard. A resolution was adopted to the effect that "the shippers present pledge themselves to energetically support the carriers in obtaining an adjustment of wages to the economic level of wages prevailing in other lines of industry. . . ." Mr. Howard suggested that it be made a public offense for a strike order (on the railroads) to be issued before the dispute had been heard and decided upon—not by the Railway Labor Board—but by the Interstate Commerce Commission. And at the end of the conference Mr. Howard found himself, as the representative of "agriculture," on a committee along with representatives of lumber, building construction, steel, fuel, and manufacture. It is evident that the interests of the farmer are scarcely identical with those of "agriculture" and that Mr. Howard can claim to represent the latter only.

Genoa: Conditions of American Participation

AMERICANS, in the great majority, wish Europe well. They would like to see peace firmly established, production revived, order restored. With due allowance for the survival of war passion and war myths, the attitude of Americans is impartial. They do not wish British ambitions to prosper at the expense of France. They do not wish Germany to be destroyed or held in eternal bondage. Reconciliation after the war between the states is the achievement in history in which

Americans take most pride. They would bring about reconciliation in Europe, if they could.

Is it not then logical to maintain, as the followers of ex-President Wilson do, that American intervention in European affairs must in all circumstances exert a healing influence? It would be logical, if we could safely assume that American policy would always be sufficiently informed to marshal itself on the right side in the controversies that must be settled before Europe can be at peace. And we are frankly sceptical on this point. We regard it as an open question whether the presence of American representatives at Genoa, for example, would facilitate the work of European settlement or act as a drag upon it.

And the reason is not at all that we place a low estimate on American abilities, or lack confidence in the good will and competence of the present administration. In its vigorous handling of the naval disarmament question at the Washington Conference the administration established its diplomatic competence beyond dispute. We believe that the administration has at its command just as adequate information on which to base a sound European policy as it had on the question of naval disarmament and the Far East. But adequate information is not in itself a sufficient guarantee of success in American diplomacy. The administration may work out a consistent policy, and conduct negotiations with foreign governments for its realization. But whether anything comes of it depends on the Senate; and whether the Senate supports the administration or obstructs its action depends very largely on public opinion.

It is not even yet certain that the compacts negotiated at the Washington Conference will be ratified by the Senate. But there is fair reason for thinking that they will be, because public opinion appears to be overwhelmingly in favor of ratification. The American people are sufficiently informed as to the criminal folly of competitive naval building. A war in the Pacific, every American knows, would be disastrous to the national interest. The administration found no difficulty in securing popular concurrence in the view that its Pacific policies greatly reduce the chance of war.

In the matter of European policy, on the other hand, the administration does not have an informed public opinion that it can count on. It has done little or nothing to create such an opinion. The administration knows very well that the present policy of the French government is not a defensive policy at all, as it is represented in the official propaganda, but an offensive policy. It is designed to build up French influence throughout Europe, to establish the kind of hegemony the

French grasped at under Louis XIV and Napoleon. The administration knows that any such policy is a grave menace to European peace. But does the administration give the public the least inkling of the facts? It does not dare to do it. It is afraid of the Francophile sentiment of the country, which does not distinguish between the gallantry and worth of the French people and the craft and cynicism of Poincaré and Tardieu, between the right of the French people to security and the claims of the French politicians to imperialistic sway in Europe.

The administration knows that there can be no economic recovery in Europe until the German indemnity is cut back to practical proportions, the military occupation of German soil brought to a close and the menace of a Ruhr invasion removed. It does not dare to say this, frankly. To be sure, it permits Mr. Hoover to say a few cautious words about the necessity of settling the indemnity issue on a practical basis. It granted to Ambassador Harvey the right to be a trifle indiscreet, in making known the administration view that the indemnity ought to be discussed at Genoa. But nobody who relies on the press for his information as to the administration attitude would divine that it recognizes the utterly destructive character of the conditions still enforced against Germany. The administration does not dare to show that it recognizes this. Like Mr. Wilson at Paris, it is ridiculously afraid of being called pro-German, if it sought rather to advance the general good of Europe and America than to inflict injury on Germany.

The administration knows that the bulk of the Allied debts Congress so blithely seeks to fund will never be paid. They will not be paid because, for a long time, the debtors will not have the means to pay them, and further, question our moral right to demand payment. Was the war for which the sums borrowed were spent our war, or wasn't it, the European taxpayer asks. If it was not our war, what were we doing there, and why did we mix up in the settlement? So long as these questions are asked, no European financier will dare to propose extra taxes for the payment of our claims. They are bad debts, which we could afford to let our statesmen use in negotiating for a decent settlement in Europe. But the administration does not dare to say so.

The administration does not dare to say that the Russian policy inherited from the Wilson regime is based upon a fundamental error. When it was adopted it was supposed that the Soviet regime was hopelessly weak, and that we had only to wait a few months until a conservative government took its place. The Soviets were supposed to be totter-

ing; that, more than the atrocities with which they were charged, made it seem impolitic to open business relations with Russia. The Soviets were not tottering. There are no indications at present that any party in Russia is strong enough to thrust them out of power. Since the contribution of Russia is necessary to European recovery some way has to be found for doing business under the Soviets, in default of any other regime in prospect. But the administration does not dare to admit this. It is afraid of the mythmongers and their dupes.

Is the administration in a position to intervene in European affairs, on the side of peace and sanity? There are four crucial matters that must be disposed of in any scheme of settlement. They are French imperialism, the German indemnity, the Allied debts and Russia. On not one of these matters does the administration dare to reveal the attitude that the facts at its command would force it to assume.

If America were to send representatives to Genoa, under instructions to cast their votes, in every case, as the best interests of America and Europe demand, can there be the least doubt that their acts would be viewed by the American public with astonishment and dismay? And can there be any doubt that such acts, if incorporated in any kind of international agreement, would be repudiated by the Senate?

We submit that the present administration is neglecting a duty essential to any effective influence upon European affairs. It is neglecting public opinion, without whose support any negotiations it may carry on are bound to prove futile. It may be said that Woodrow Wilson tried out the method of informing public opinion, and found it a failure. That, we think, is to misinterpret the facts. Wilson did, as a matter of fact, succeed in establishing a remarkably firm foundation in public opinion for his war policies and peace aims. If he was defeated in the end, it was partly because he abandoned his own method in favor of the conventional methods of secretive statesmanship, and partly because his opponents adopted his method and beat him at it. The present administration has a far less difficult problem of publicity. Much of the work done by Wilson is still available for use. We are much more international-minded, as a people, on account of it. We can be made to see that European peace is our business, as well as Europe's, and that we can afford to make sacrifices for it. But we shall not see what concrete policies America ought to support until the administration takes up the obligation that rests upon it of informing the public on the fundamental issues involved in European settlement.

Can the Farmer Be Bought Off?

IT is now many months since the agricultural bloc first emerged as the most powerful single influence in national legislation. During the special session of Congress it vetoed many of the important bills proposed by the Republican leaders and the administration; and the fiscal and tariff legislation in the form which it finally assumed was far more agreeable to the agrarian Senators than it was to their fellow Republicans from the East. There is no sign as yet of any diminution in the disposition or the ability of the agricultural bloc to control the output of the Congress. Both the administration and the Republican leaders are disturbed by the prospect that the new tariff and the new tax bills will not pull through the process of Senate emendation in a condition any more satisfactory to them than did the makeshift measures of the special session. Their legislative program, which, in spite of a great deal of vocal interest in the farmer, was conceived chiefly for the benefit of large industry, is still jeopardized. Their apparent impotence is hurting their prestige and their chance of future success at the polls. They are afraid that, if this impotence continues, the voters will elect a democratic majority in the House of Representatives next fall.

Although they have reason for disquietude and are forced to do something about it, they are clearly puzzled as to the best way of dealing with the insubordinate farmers. Now and then some representative leader breaks into print with a threat to declare war on the bloc just as his predecessors in 1909 declared war on the insurgents. He always begins by denouncing the behavior of the bloc as the un-American usurpation of power by a minor economic group in its own special interest. But after this brave beginning he usually subsides. He suddenly discovers that the farmers have too many votes. The President is evidently opposed to a fight. He has consented to place a representative of agriculture on the Federal Reserve Board. He has called a farmers' conference for the purpose of finding out what the farmers themselves really want. He will include in the legislative program bills which will permit farmers to combine for the marketing of their products and which will enable farmers to obtain both temporary and permanent loans with smaller difficulty and expense. His policy is in short to buy off the opposition of the agrarian insurgents to the Republican fiscal and tariff policies.

He may succeed; but we doubt it. We doubt,

that is, whether either the proposed legislation or any legislation to which the Republican leaders will consent will satisfy the farmers and put a quietus on their insurgency. The agrarian discontent of which the emergence of the agricultural bloc in Congress is the American expression is a world-wide fact. Among all the industrial peoples economic conditions have for generations favored urban industry and have placed an increasing proportion of the resources of the community at the service of the city to the disadvantage of the country. No where else has the discrimination in favor of industry been carried as far as it has in the United States. Not only has the high level of tariff protection accelerated the drift of labor and capital to the cities but the structure of railway rates, the ability of combinations to maintain prices, the existence of large margins of profits, and the huge supplies of immigrant labor have all stimulated industry at the expense of agriculture. The effect of this stimulation was partly neutralized before the war by the increase in agricultural land values, but the existing agricultural distress is in part the accumulated result of it. The tendency of the official Republican policy is to increase still further the discrimination in favor of industry. The Republican leaders propose so far as possible to take taxes off of business and particularly large business and large incomes and put more of it on consumption and on small incomes. They propose to increase the protection of American industry, although it is clear that the barriers against imports into America are one of the chief reasons for the decline in American exports. If the Old Guard purchase the consent of the farmers to this program by the kind of legislation which the recent farmer's conference proposed, the farmers and their representatives will prove to be more gullible than they look.

Probably the opposition of the agricultural bloc to the official Republican policy will continue. In that event the President and the Republican leaders will face the disagreeable necessity of deciding whether they will make further concessions or whether they will fight. The alternative of a fight looks disastrous and is so opposed to the President's preference for compromise and persuasion that the chances run against its adoption. But he will avoid it only with difficulty. For the disagreement within the party is only the symptom of a serious conflict between the existing interests of two major American classes. American industry is as a result of the prevailing price level partly parasitic on American agriculture. The government can hardly cure the discrepancy by an increase in favors to American agriculture. The

only promising way of bringing the parasitism to an end is by squeezing some of the waste and favoritism out of industry. The farmers have not as yet discovered this truth but, if and when they do, a fight is inevitable. In any event a continuation of their past obstructive policy may very well precipitate an amount of ill-feeling which will result willy-nilly in an outbreak of hostilities. It is entirely possible that in 1923 and 1924 a bitter contest will take place within the Republican party between the agricultural and industrial sections for the privilege of making the next Republican Presidential candidate.

These statements are, of course, guesses about the future behavior of a doubtful and incalculable process of political and social change. The economic and political outlook is as foggy as it is forbidding, and specific prophecies have a poor chance of vindication. We are passing through a period of social dislocation and re-grouping. There is as yet no sufficient reason for predicting how far the disintegration of old associations and loyalties will go and what new groups or clusters of groups will form to take their place. The larger economic classes are less homogeneous than they were. The big business men are not so much divided from the small business men as they used to be, but they are more divided among themselves into factions which wish to encourage foreign trade and groups which wish to encourage domestic trade. There are manifest diversities of interest between the farmers, the price of whose products is fixed abroad, and farmers, the price of whose product is fixed in this country. Even more important is the division of outlook and policy between the farm owner and the increasing body of farm tenants. As for the wage-earners, they are split into unionists and non-unionists, into orthodox unionists and unorthodox unionists, skilled and unskilled workmen and into the supporters of the A. F. of L. machine and the rebels against it. These domestic differences within the groups are often submerged for long intervals, but they always jump to the surface whenever any one economic class assumes as a whole or in part the responsibility of government.

The Republican party, considered in the light both of its origin and its history, will as the result of this process of social dislocation and re-grouping find its cohesiveness subjected to a severe test. It consisted in the beginning of a coalition between the pioneer agrarian communities which rallied to the Union in 1861 and the rising industrial communities of the North and East. It combined a policy of protection for industry with a policy of a quick and complete division of the national do-

main. Its first constructive measures of economic legislation were the Morrill tariff and the Homestead act. The vitality of this coalition diminished during the agricultural discontent of the nineties and during the insurrection against big business between 1902 and 1912. But nothing has happened as yet to break up the combination. The question is whether and how far it will survive the probably future divergence of interest between the city and the country. If as now seems probable the agricultural distress must continue until some of the waste and some of the existing control of prices is squeezed out of industry and until the cost of industrial products to the consumer is not separated by such a wide margin from their cost to the producer, then it is doubtful how far the coalition which entitled the Republicans for so long to consider themselves the national party will persist. About 1832 an agricultural bloc under the leadership of Andrew Jackson destroyed the two strongholds of what they then called the "Money Power"—the National Bank and the protective tariff. The combination between an agricultural and a labor bloc may within the next five years try to imitate the performance.

This expectation of a breach in the coalition between American agriculture and industry which has given vitality to the Republican party may, we must admit, share the usual fate of political prophecies. American partisan loyalties are capable of surviving terrific strains. The Republican organism is now sustained by sources of strength wholly independent of its original composition and it will survive any dislocating influences which are not the product of a fundamental alteration in the distribution and balance of social power. Such changes are, no doubt, bound to accrue in the course of time, but it is easy to anticipate a speedier triumph on their part than they are capable of winning. Yet if the Republican party does survive for many years the increasing conflict between the agricultural and industrial interest, it can hardly shine during this period of distraction as an example of political economy and efficiency.

Consisting as it will of a combination of increasingly incompatible elements which is held together by common antipathies and a common craving for power rather than by an effective agreement about the use to which political power should be put, it will move awkwardly and at the cost of enormous friction. It will become incapable of important constructive legislation. It will be certain to dodge rather than to face its graver domestic responsibilities, which is precisely what it is already doing.

The Spectacle of Coal

CURTAIN-rise is April 1st.

The settings, according to advertisement, will be a strike scene, nation-wide.

Cast of characters: the coal miner (500,000 of him); the coal operator (including coal railroads, coal sales companies, financiers—nobody knows the list); the "people," "the great third party, whose paramount interest is vital, must not be put in jeopardy," etc. (see any congressional report or presidential speech).

Emotional displays guaranteed. There will be thunder and lightning off stage. But if the piece is to be intelligible part of its success must depend on the lines. Will the characters know what they're talking about?

What the miners are rehearsing has leaked a little: in protests against slack work—one to three days' work a week; in memorials to Congress—resulting in pigeon-holed resolutions to investigate destitution in mining towns; in demands for negotiations—refused by the operators; in protests against lowering wages to non-union rates as a standard of living.

A sample of the operators' speeches was submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the National Coal Association. It was one of those neat diagrams of "what becomes of the dollar received by the bituminous coal operator"—a wheel with four sectors labelled "67.8 percent to the miners; 12.6 percent for supplies; 10.8 percent for other operating expenses; 8.8 percent for general expenses." Commonly in these circles there's an exigent sector, like a war-time piece of pie, labelled "profits." But there's no pie in this wheel.

The soft coal industry from April to October, 1921, according to these statistics, was run as a philanthropy. Since the miners allege destitution, who got the philanthropy?

Supposedly the great third party must look to the government for data for its rôle. The Department of Labor, it is announced, is collecting wage rates, "representative pay-rolls," as much as operators may vouchsafe; but it remains to be seen whether the data will be representative of the crucial non-union fields, whether the results will answer the question "how much money was actually paid to the miners for the year"? The Department of Commerce is understood to be gathering coal export statistics. The Department of Justice—is it erasing railroaders' names from arrest warrants, unused recently, and inserting names of miners?

"I never would permit unions," says Attorney-

General Daugherty, "to break up the open shop," in coal. Mr. Hoover said that the Department of Justice was cooperating in coal investigations. Mr. Daugherty says, "The country can't live on investigations and I want to shut down on them as far as possible"

What the miner part of the third party thinks of such governmental activity is hinted in an editorial in a paper owned by anthracite workers, the Panther Creek News, which became the topic of emphatic comment in Congress:

You can't tell the cost of mining a ton of coal by just calculating how much meat, bread and potatoes will keep a miner alive. The miners are sick of that kind of statistics.

Nobody would accuse Senator Frelinghuysen of being a friend of labor and yet it was Frelinghuysen who told the Senate last month, "We cannot find out what the coal costs are because the National Coal Association has put out the eyes of the Government by the injunction in the Maynard Coal case." In that case the operators have actually enjoined the Federal Trade Commission from carrying out the law, the law to publish the facts about profits.

The Government is giving us imitation investigations. Secretary Hoover announces that President Harding's Unemployment Conference is investigating slack work in the soft coal fields. And the money for that investigation is put up by the coal operators. Is that kind of "government" inquiry likely to tell the facts about the chief cause of slack work; over-development? That would mean telling capitalizations and profits.

There is every prospect that the April spectacle will be a poor show. From present preparations we shall not know what we're talking about. "Coal is a public utility," begins the first thesis in Senator Kenyon's report on West Virginia. But the basic facts of this public utility are unknown, both to the government and to the persons in the industry. As to *costs* and *profits*, no one knows the capitalization of the industry; how much of book value is water and how much real money; whether salaries and depreciation charges are reasonable; or anything for any controlled adjustment of producers', wholesalers' and retailers' prices. As to *labor*, no one knows the miners' actual earnings, hours and conditions of work, or expenditures. As to *production* and *distribution*, the admirable Geological Survey reports are not issued regularly on many of the most necessary phases. *Prices* we have to glean from what the operators tell their trade journals. *Financing* is a quite closed book, hiding the ownership of the coal lands, the leases and royalties, the contracts between collieries and railroads and coal sales companies and other industries.

We do know that high authorities deem it all "our worst run basic industry." We do know that a strike will spring from the industry's demoralization rather than from human cussedness. Human

ability to stand deprivation, however, is expected to "settle" the strike.

Suppose now a firm voice:

"We demand what this country has never had—the full facts about the coal industry.

"Not another eleventh-hour senatorial inquiry; men who know mines smile at the ordinary legislator's questions about coal.

"Not a permanent commission primarily charged with settling strikes.

"We demand that Congress authorize a fact-finding commission, half of miners, half of operators, with a chairman appointed by the President, and with governmental powers of inquiry, fetching witnesses and books to its hearings.

"We demand that this commission publicly canvass as well the findings of other government agencies; and particularly that the Federal Trade Commission be called on for the facts which it is now enjoined from getting.

"We suggest that the facts of the three years since the war be covered and the three years prior to 1914.

"The questions which must be answered are:

What working and what living does the miner get?

What makes coal cost what it does?

What profits go at each stage and to whom?

"Whether it's a strike or the rebuilding of an industry, we will follow the facts."

It will have to be a pretty large voice. It won't be the operator's. It will hardly be the public's, so far as Washington initiative is concerned. Might it be the miners', meeting this week in national convention?

Determination would be needed, to get such an investigation,—almost as much as to meet a spring strike.

The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1922, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT; ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER; DANIEL MEBANE, CIRCULATION MANAGER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY ALVIN JOHNSON
FRANCIS HACKETT PHILIP LITTELL
ROBERT MORSS LOVETT
ROBERT LITTELL, Assistant Editor

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FIVE DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES FIFTEEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS, FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, SIX DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE; REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

Federal Reserve and the Farmer

NOW that the National Agricultural Conference has come to a close without condemning the policy of the Federal Reserve system during the past few years and without more than passing mention of the Board, it is fair to assume that the danger of a drastic assault upon the Board and its members is pretty well over. Nowhere in the numerous recommendations and resolutions of that Conference can one find any really condemnatory utterance. This will come as a surprise to those who had supposed that the perfervid utterances of certain Senators and the flamboyant accusations of John Skelton Williams represented the opinion of the agricultural regions.

Early in the summer of 1921 representatives of the farm interests appeared before the Commission of Agricultural Inquiry at Washington and charged openly that the Board had forced the banks to withdraw credit from the agricultural districts and had put it at the disposal of the financial centres. They insisted that the action of the Federal Reserve Board had resulted in a greater contraction of loans in agriculture than in any other line of business, and challenged anyone to produce figures to the contrary. According to these spokesmen for the farmers, the quantity theory of money had worked perfectly and quickly. The contraction assumed to have taken place in the country had brought about an enforced marketing of products which in turn had broken the prices of the things which the farmer produced. According to them the power of the Federal Reserve System had been directed against the farmer for the benefit of the speculator in securities and commodities.

Then Mr. Williams, the former Comptroller of the Currency, made a speech down in Georgia. His powers of flamboyant utterance, which are never deficient, were at their best. His Augusta speech was fully up to the previous high standards which he had set for himself in his annual report for 1918, where, in commenting upon the usury discovered among the national banks, he burst into this bit of eloquence: "Yet in some parts of this country we were in a worse condition in this respect than were the people of fifty centuries ago, and men and women in the United States in the twentieth century were bitten more deeply than were the ancient Hebrews; were destroyed and enslaved more grievously than were the Canaanites, declared enemies of God's chosen people.

American citizens were in the position of the poor of Rome under the oppression of the usurers.

No fire when Tiber freezes,
No air in Summer's heat;
But stores of rods for freeborn backs,
And stocks for freeborn feet."

He charged that under the policies pursued by the Reserve Board credit became stiff and inelastic where it should have been liberal, dangerously lenient where it should have been oppressive. An Alabama bank was made to pay four percent a month for rediscounts with the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank. "In fact, the rate charged for a portion of that money was actually 84½ percent per annum." "While small banks in the farming districts were being taxed in this manner, great banks in New York were being supplied with practically unlimited amounts of money at five, six, and seven percent." In the opinion of Mr. Williams nothing except the fact that the United States is the richest and strongest country ever known keeps us from facing today "disaster by comparison with which the disaster following the explosion of the South Sea Bubble would appear trivial."

The cumulative effect of these criticisms, which were presently echoed in Congress, was too much for members of the Federal Reserve Board. The former Comptroller was heard by the Joint Congressional Commission, and the members of the Board answered him. Most of the isolated cases which he cited proved to be misleading. The small bank in Alabama had been charged exorbitant rates by its reserve bank without the knowledge of the Federal Reserve Board. As soon as that body discovered what had happened, it ordered that all interest charged this bank and other banks in excess of twelve percent under the progressive rate be refunded.

It turned out, too, that the large advances to New York banks were necessitated by the fact that the interior bankers withdrew their money from New York, as they have done in every period immediately preceding a financial depression. In January, 1920, the balances of interior banks with New York banks amounted to \$838,000,000; by June, 1921, they had fallen to \$537,000,000. In addition these interior banks withdrew almost \$300,000,000 which they had loaned upon the New York Stock Exchange. It was inevitable that the New York Federal Reserve Bank should be called upon to help its member banks meet this withdrawal of funds.

Nor were the demands of the interior banks limited to the withdrawal of a large part of their deposits and loans. Those interior banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve system sought aid from the New York banks to tide them over this crisis. Of the 30,812 banks in the United States, less than ten thousand are members of the system. The remaining twenty thousand look largely to New York to lend them money, as they have done in every previous crisis. The member banks of New York City were obliged, therefore, to share the responsibility of acting as reserve agencies for the banks of the country. At the beginning of 1920 the deposits which the interior banks carried with the New York Clearing House banks were approximately equal to the reserves which all the member banks of the system carried with the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. Single banks in New York lost more than one hundred million dollars in country bank deposits, and were in addition asked to loan large amounts to their non-member correspondents. It was inevitable that such an institution should borrow heavily from the New York Federal Reserve Bank.

Nor is it true that the contraction of bank loans in the agricultural districts exceeded that in the financial centres. The chain of causation which was supposed to begin with a policy of restriction on the part of the Federal Reserve Board and a resulting decrease in bank loans, and which ran thence to a forced marketing of farm products culminating in lower prices, has a beautiful logical consistency. But evidently the crucial link in the chain is the supposed decrease in bank loans. Anyone who takes the trouble to compare the rate of growth in bank loans in the various sections from 1914 to 1920 will find that while the country as a whole increased by 103 percent, the New England States increased by only 65 percent. New York increased by 104 percent. The Middle States increased 105 percent; the Southern States by 139 percent; and the Western States by 163 percent. It appears, therefore, that the expansion of bank credit was relatively greatest in those sections which are devoted to agriculture. A closer analysis of the figures of loans shows that the growth in these agricultural states was especially rapid after the signing of the armistice.

The Comptroller of the Currency has just issued his report for 1921, in which he shows the loans of all banks, state and national, as of June 30, 1921. The shrinkage in loans for the entire country is less than 7 percent. New England, which expanded only 65 percent, has contracted only 3 percent. New York State, which had increased at about the average rate for the whole country, has contracted 11 percent. The Middle States, which contain manufacturing and commer-

cial centres like Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit, have contracted almost 7 percent. The Southern States, which had expanded 139 percent, have contracted a trifle more than 9 percent; while the Western States, which had increased 165 percent, have contracted 12. When we examine the loans in cities like New York, Detroit, or Kansas City, we find that their rate of contraction has been much greater than that of the country districts in which they are located.

The Comptroller's report shows also that of the total contraction for all banks in the United States, amounting to \$2,187,000,000 between June, 1920, and June, 1921, the national banks accounted for \$1,842,000,000. This leaves only \$345,000,000 as the contraction in the 22,658 state banks and trust companies, although their loans comprise 60 percent of the total loans of all banks. These are the banks which are located in large part in the agricultural districts; their contraction is only a trifle over 2 percent.

Other and more detailed investigations which have been made recently all confirm the erroneous nature of the assumption that the agricultural districts have had a more rapid contraction than have the financial centres. The chain of causation running from a policy of loan restriction to reduction in the prices of farm products breaks, therefore, at its crucial link.

Without doubt the Federal Reserve system has made minor mistakes in policy during the past two years. The Board has admitted as much and has pointed out specific things which it would do differently in the light of experience. But we must remember that the system was only five years old when it became apparent that the succession of boom, crisis, and depression was at hand. At this crucial time the Board found itself hampered by the political necessities of war finance, as well as by a lack of experience concerning the exact effect of interest rates and bank contraction upon prices and productive activity. It averted a money crisis in the autumn of 1920. It minimized the number of business failures. It could not restrain the people from acting foolishly in the matter of contracting debts at unheard-of prices. People who were determined to buy land in Nebraska "on the basis of a value of \$300 per acre when the banks refused to lend money on a basis higher than \$155 per acre" are embarrassed despite the policies of the Federal Reserve Board, rather than because of them.

Whatever accusations may finally be brought against the Board, it cannot fairly be charged that it reduced agricultural prices by a conscious policy of credit contraction in the rural districts. Judging from the attitude of the Agricultural Conference at Washington, the rural community has come to realize this fact.

DAVID FRIDAY.

The Ether Will Now Oblige

THE taxi driver at 181st Street wasn't at all sure he could find the place. It was a dark night, and the streets out that way were bein' fixed. We coaxed him to try, crossed the river on a high bridge, and slid up and down several dark lanes, before we reached the spot we were seeking, a long and narrow brick shed with one lighted doorway in the middle.

In at the doorway, down a long passage, up a flight of stairs into a room with that curious atmosphere of a place intended for day-time business and used instead at night. Desks and chairs; a huge phonograph horn coming out of the wall at one end at a height of six feet from the floor; and across the corner by it a large white marble switchboard standing out a little as a pier-glass might be placed. The face of this board was cluttered with instruments—dials, handles and, dominating the rest, several hooded electric lights in glass tubes, which reminded one visitor immediately—so much stronger is literature than life—of the ray and its vigilant slave in Mr. Kipling's *With the Night Mail*.

A phonograph and some men completed the furnishings of the room. The phonograph, one of those ornate cabinet affairs, stood near the switchboard, and the men were clustered about it. They were properly dressed as business men, yet you saw at once, or imagined you did, that they belonged to that extraordinary group which dedicates itself to Machines and is never truly happy unless attired in overalls and a wad of cotton waste.

All ready for the demonstration? Right! One of the gentlemen steps forward and picks up a telephone which is connected with the switchboard (there are also several sets of telephone head-dresses such as operators wear, lying on a neat little mahogany box with a black metal front into which their cords are plugged). A switch is pushed home on the white board; remotely under our feet somewhere the sound of machinery in agitation is heard; the bright tubes of light are brighter and steadier; without so much as a "by your leave" our gentleman is speaking into his telephone. "Hello hello hello hello hello," he says in a voice just a little above an ordinary speaking tone. "This is station KLG. Stand by for a little music on the phony-graph."

He drops the telephone, and puts a record on the machine. We hear, very faintly as though it might be several doors down the street, the Sextette from Lucia.

"There are probably five or six thousand people

hearing that record," says our gentleman, leaning gracefully against the instrument. "Might be twenty or twenty-five thousand; you never can tell. The amateurs all listen in about this time of evening."

It sounds incredible, yet it is undoubtedly so. In hundreds and hundreds of homes, all over New York City, New Jersey, Long Island and up through New York State, in apartments, suburban villas, farm houses, the amateurs are sitting beside their boxes twirling the knobs on top, listening with the "head-set" over their ears, while the Sextette wings its way through the ether in three hundred and sixty meter waves. They listen, not because they love the music—which would sound much better played on the phonographs which doubtless stand silent in their own homes—but because they love the magic of the radio-telephone.

"Want to hear it?" says our own high priest of the mystery. Before we can murmur that we are already hearing it and don't much care for it, another of the group is at the mahogany chest, twisting knobs like Jimmy Valentine opening a safe. From the huge phonograph horn above our heads comes a sudden shrill whistle which rises and falls, a terrific volume of noise battering at our ears, which is, no doubt, made by some far-off world as it flees shrieking in agony across the firmament.

Friend No. 2 continues his knob-twirling and in a moment this celestial caterwauling is shouldered aside, so to speak, by the Sextette, being sung in our very ears and evidently by giants a hundred feet tall and on the point of bursting all their blood-vessels. It is much too loud; even the radio zealots perceive this, and they choke it down with the knobs until it sounds no noisier than Sousa's band does to Sousa. Behind the music one still hears a wailing of winds lost somewhere in the universe and very unhappy about it. Still, science has conquered; the music is there, and more than recognizable. From the phonograph it has been tossed off into the limitless ether which it fills for hundreds of miles in every direction; the ethereal waves have been caught again by the antennae on our roof, brought down and hurled upon us from the horn.

Would we care to listen to the broadcasting going on from some other station? By all means; we are determined to make a night of it, even though it means hearing the Sextette eleven times. Perhaps we would like to use headpieces, as most of the amateurs do, instead of the more sophisticated horn? The receivers are adjusted to our ears; the knobs are twirled again. The genius of the place explains, as a noise like the crackle of

frying fat grows louder in our ears or dies away.

That noise we hear is the static electricity in the air; much worse than usual tonight. It's one of the two big problems confronting radio-telephony. The other is how to prevent "owning the air." When two stations are working at a wave-length (in the ether) of three hundred meters, nobody else can operate in their part of the world at a rate anywhere near that, either up or down the scale. This means that only a few stations can talk simultaneously in the same territory. Some experts think the answer will be found eventually in transmitting through water or earth, with even more powerful amplifiers than are in use today, to pick up the weak waves and translate them into such an uproar as we have already been hearing—

He is interrupted by the sound of another phonograph coming rather faintly through the telephone receivers. "That's Trenton broadcasting station," we are told. "People listening to him for three hundred miles—perhaps five hundred—in all directions." But great Heavens! It is Caruso in *I Pagliacci*!—Caruso dead and buried these many months, yet singing to us and perhaps twenty thousand others, down out of the ether on this cold winter's night, all by way of a phonograph and a few feet of wire in Newark, a few feet of wire and a telephone in New York. Oh, Signor Cagliostro, how your jaw would drop at this!

Caruso ends, magnificently as always, and is followed in a moment by a genial gentleman who makes a few remarks in a thick baritone. "This is KGX," he observes. "Stand by, stand by! Stand by for a weather report, and then some news bulletins and then Miss Maria Altenbrite, the famous soprano, will sing for us."

There is a moment of silence. Nobody has answered him back; most of his ten or twenty thousand hearers, or whatever the number happens to be tonight, could not if they wanted to, having only listening-stations—which must be a sad plight for an argumentative man. KGX—the initials are not his own, but the arbitrary combination assigned to him and duly listed in the government's annual directory of stations—proceeds to tell us about the weather. Then he reads a few bulletins of news, which sound exactly like the things they chalk up in front of newspaper offices. Another pause, and "Stand by, stand by! KGX speaking, KGX! Miss Maria Altenbrite will now sing *Dreaming of You*." Which she does, in just the manner you would expect from the singer of a song with that title. The human voice is rather louder and clearer than the phonograph record, though the subdued crackle of the static in the background makes it still sound somewhat tinny.

Perhaps our faces indicate a too critical attitude; for our friend and mentor twists a knob and chokes off Miss Altenbrite in the middle of a phrase. As we jump out of her wave-length into a higher one, she ends with the squawk of a decapitated chicken. However, this is the sort of concert from which one may make his exit and not hurt the singer's feelings. If the whole audience "signed off" (disconnected the instruments) Miss Altenbrite would be none the wiser, and would send her trills just as sweetly through ninety thousand square miles of night.

Up we go through the wave-lengths; and across the crackling static, we suddenly hear the hissing of a methodical dot-and-dash wireless telegraph message. "That's Norfolk, Virginia, talking to a ship at sea somewhere," we are told, and when we want to know what Norfolk has to say, "Oh, it's just commercial stuff—a list of items in a shipment, I guess. . . . Talking about six cases of shoes from the Excelsior Manufacturing Company, of Lynn, Massachusetts, right now."

Up another thousand meters or so. A second telegraph message, a higher note, and a faster tempo. "I guess that's press stuff from Paris to London," says the man at the knobs. "We usually pick them up about this time of night." Does it not seem like high impropriety to sit in New York and eavesdrop on the transmission of news between Paris and London? Not to the experts, who are quite calm about it. "We pick up Moscow now and then," says our friend. "When they opened the new Sayville station, very high power, they think the first signal went around the world and back into their own instrument, but it's hard to be sure. It only takes a thirtieth of a second to cross the Atlantic."

Is there no end to these marvels? We learn, in language condescendingly fitted to our ignorance, that there are at least 250,000 amateur radio operators in the United States, most of whom can listen but cannot transmit. Five thousand more are added every month or so. You can get a practical outfit for \$25; a first-rate one for \$75 to \$250. Amateurs are restricted to two hundred meter wave-lengths or less, and are supposed to operate over short distances only. However, on the historic night of December 7, 1921, when the great transatlantic tests were made by American, English and Scotch amateurs, twenty-six Americans, most of them using home-made equipment, made their code signals heard in Scotland. These were in telegraphic form; voice-transmission is still limited to a few hundred miles. But then, wireless telegraphy itself is only eighteen years old, telephony perhaps a third of that.

The Bureau of Markets, Department of Agriculture, is broadcasting by radio (telegraph) crop, weather and market news every day throughout the country. These messages will soon be caught in every state, and transmitted again by radio telephone to as many farmers as want them and will spend a few dollars for equipment. This service, a year old, is already used by 25,000 listeners, including producers, shippers, dealers, brokers, commission men, warehousemen, banks and others. Several newspapers are giving nightly radio telephone programs of news, music, and lectures to listeners in their vicinity. There are nine magazines devoted to radio and any quantity of books. The United States Public Health Service is broadcasting two lectures on health every week. On Tuesdays at 4:15 P. M., Washington time, 1,100 meter wave length, and Fridays at 9 P. M., Washington time, three hundred and fifteen meter wave length, you may tune up to the proper pitch and hear sage remarks on the undesirability of over-eating, wet feet, and gastritis. You may write questions to the U. S. P. H. S., and perhaps at the end of a Friday evening's chat you—and a few thousand others—will hear the answer. (Too personal queries might well, one would think, be

avoided.) The policemen in Chicago are being equipped with pocket radio, with wires inside their coats. Headquarters will soon be able to reach every one of them with a message in a few minutes' time . . .

But with all this talk we are missing the program. Trenton will be signing off soon; wouldn't we like some more music? The ether stands ready to oblige.

We think not, thanks; we prefer to stumble downstairs and out again into the silent lanes to meditate on the civilization of 1930, when there will be only one orchestra left on earth, giving nightly world-wide concerts; when all the universities will be combined into one super-institution conducting courses by radio for students in Zanzibar, Kamchatka and Oskaloosa; when instead of newspapers, trained orators will dictate the news of the world day and night, and the bed-time story will be told every evening from Paris to the sleepy children of a weary world; when every person will be instantly accessible day or night to all the bores he knows, and will know them all; when the last vestiges of privacy, solitude and contemplation will have vanished into limbo.

BRUCE BLIVEN.

France and the Pact

IN offering to France a guarantee of her frontier against German aggression, the British government has been grappling with one of the most delicate and difficult problems which national psychology could possibly present. Anyone who pauses to reflect, will realize at once that a guarantee of this kind might well have two totally opposite effects. Such treaties are always subject to two interpretations. This particular pact might be accepted, as I believe it is intended, in its severely literal sense. We promise that if ever a German army should, wantonly, and without provocation, invade an innocent and harmless France, we will come to her aid. That, indeed, is no more than we promised, three years ago, in the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the other hand, history shows that such undertakings are invariably held to convey much more than their bald literal sense. The implications in this case are obvious—a general attitude of partiality, if not of partisanship, towards France, an attitude of vigilance and indeed suspicion towards Germany, and, therefore, for ten years to come, if for no longer, a general obligation to support the continental policy of

France, and to oppose, if France strongly desires it, whatever in the way of claim, petition, complaint, proposal or accusation may come from Berlin. Nearly everyone in England would reject this latter interpretation, while a considerable part of public opinion—possibly, but not certainly a majority—might, with much hesitation, and no enthusiasm, endorse the former. Everything turns upon one's reading of the French national temper.

Here again there are two views; the usual view may be described as indulgent rather than respectful. It is that France is still suffering from an acute neurosis of war-time. We had our own experience of that distressing malady. In our case sanity returned quickly. Can one be surprised that in the case of France the mental disturbance should last much longer? The deep wound of devastation is not yet closed. Her casualties were heavier than ours. Nor has she the intricate trading relations, which force us to think internationally. It took an unexampled crisis of unemployment to make us completely sane. Again, the haunted land frontier, the memories of the secular feud with Germany, and the hopeless inequality of the two populations,

engender a nervous fatalism about the future. France, in short, is suffering from an obsession, a nightmare, in which she sees the invading hordes forever trampling her soil. She is feverish, and under the influence of this fear, her conduct is irrational and unbalanced. She tries to appear formidable, menacing, unyielding, to conceal the alarm from which in fact she suffers. Let us then sit by her bedside, hold her hand through the watches of the night, and show her that with our sure aid the doors and windows are really securely bolted. She will wake one morning with smiling face and steady nerves, and then we can both proceed together, to work calmly and constructively for the restoration of a shattered continent.

There is some truth in this version, but in the main, I think, it is a deduction from the traditional British view of France, which I hold to be essentially false. That view thought of the French as an unstable, excitable and even frivolous people. The female personification of "France" was stressed till it seriously distorted thinking—though one would have thought that the persistence of such primitive male habits as the duel, should have warned us of our error. I believe on the contrary that no society in Europe is in essentials so stable, so steady in its purposes, so united and solid and nearly unanimous, so essentially conservative. For steadiness and unity, under unexampled trials, no people in Europe during the late war approached the French record. Now this closely knit society has a wonderfully persistent traditional view of its own place in Europe. The tradition is jealously preserved by a system of education which gives much more attention to the study of the national literature and history than any other in Europe. In that respect English education is amazingly careless. Our own part in Europe was in comparison with that of France recent and slight. We played no important or continuous rôle on the continent until Dutch William took us in hand. We attained leadership for the first time under Pitt. The French tradition of leadership begins with Charlemagne, and sometimes in struggle, sometimes in success it is astonishingly persistent. Take the period from Louis XIV to Louis Napoleon. Can one fail to read in it the working of a continuous personality and an unwavering view of French greatness as the natural leader of Europe? The form and inspiration of politics may alter sharply, but two things persist—the belief in the cultural leadership of France, her preeminence as the teacher and intellectual master, and secondly the pride in her military supremacy. No other nation spends public money as she does, even today, in spreading her language and maintaining schools

abroad. The idea is cherished, but the irresistible sword is always at the service of the idea. This nationalism has rarely been ignoble, but at the same time it is and was militaristic and inevitably aggressive. We in our lifetime have known a very different France, the relatively modest France of defeat, leading a life of comparative concentration within her own borders. We naturally think of this as the normal France. History suggests a different reading, and the megalomania of today, the far-flung continental system that recalls Napoleon, may well be a reversion to type, and the revival of a submerged personality.

France, in short, after a generation of eclipse is herself again. She returns, however, to a world which has evolved beyond her leadership. When, little more than a century ago, Napoleon's armies set up protected and occupied states on German soil, they were welcomed as liberators by a great part of the population. They brought with them not merely a superior culture, but also new ideas of democracy and enlightenment. That day is gone. The grandsons of these same Germans in their turn feel that they now have the superior culture, while in its social services, and even in the mechanism of democracy, the Germans of the modern Reich have nothing to learn from the French Republic. The ideal leadership is gone, and Frenchmen actually learn with amazement that they are no longer welcomed and imitated and admired, when their colored troops carry the magic flag to the old scenes of triumph. Even in the more backward parts of Europe, the more elaborate German civilization has preceded them, and set standards which contest their claims. The result is that their pretensions are opposed, their pride is resented, their leadership is challenged, as it was not a century ago, and they find themselves profoundly unpopular. If this moral asset has disappeared, materially their case is much worse. Their industry is backward. Their technical skill is second-rate. Their stationary population forces them to buttress their military power on the odious reinforcement of African levies. The will to supremacy may be strong, but in spite of a momentary superiority in military power unexampled in European history, the basis is insecure, and they know it. It is this, rather than a temperamental or morbid nervousness, which explains their unbalanced recklessness.

If this be a true or even partially true diagnosis, then the offer of a guarantee to allay their fears was a mistaken expedient. They suffer from a species of fear. But it is fear with a difference, a superb fear. It is an apprehension that in spite of all, these barbarous tribes of Germany and Rus-

sia may one day revolt and overbear France by sheer weight of numbers. Rome knew that fear. As yet the last thing which it engenders is prudence. The day of rebellion in any case is distant, perhaps twenty, at worst ten years hence. The materialism of war time as yet suggests only strategical safeguards. By arms, by alliances, by alterations of the map, by buffers and barriers, and "barbed wire," by "sanctions" and tributes and indemnities, it may be possible to delay this revolt and to render it futile when it comes. Few Frenchmen as yet perceive that although the deliberate policy of ruining or weakening Germany and Russia may rob them for a time of the power to rebel, it infallibly reinforces the motive to rebel. The workings of a proud ancestral tradition would not alone account for this folly. Economic considerations reinforce it. Why is it that Englishmen are willing to forego the German indemnity and the Russian debt, and for that matter the French debt as well, while no single French politician dare support even a reduction of the claim? It is not an answer to say that France was devastated and England was not. Our indirect war loss, in vanished trade, crushing taxation and mass unemployment is heavier than hers. The difference lies, I think, in the structure of the two societies. France with her small peasant farms, her two-children families, her dowry system, her emphasis upon inheritance, values accumulated property and investments as we do not. Our Russian debt is in amount almost exactly equal to hers. We hope to recoup ourselves for the loss of it by new enterprises. She insists on literal repayment. It is the difference between a society with an enterprising and adventurous industrial tradition, and a society of small properties, small industries and jealously guarded inheritances. She lays stress on keeping, we on gaining. She defends a claim: we value an opportunity. Here then is the explanation of the fact that she is so implacable in the matter of the German indemnity and the Russian debt. We want to trade and she to draw tribute. So it happens that economics reinforce tradition to make her militarist. Her armies, her Polish allies, her colored troops, even her submarines, are to her what forges and mills and ships are to an industrial people, the means of extracting wealth.

Everything that has happened since the Cannes Conference met, confirms this reading of the dominant French mind. It is not a guarantee of their frontier which the French desire, so much as a guarantee of their continental system. Their insistence on an equal and mutual alliance made that clear. They want a bond which by all the conventions of statecraft in Europe commits the two

powers, by diplomacy and by arms, to the pursuit of a common policy. That policy is the literal execution of the Versailles Treaty, and the extraction of the indemnity. If they "recognize" Russia eventually, it will only be to apply to Russia also the now familiar technique for the extraction of tribute. The strong pressure to include Poland in the alliance made this current of thought even clearer. Now here it seems to me, we come upon two absolute incompatibles. The levying of the indemnity cannot be made consistent with any recovery of markets for ourselves or any general restoration of Europe. The continued occupation of the Rhineland cannot be squared with any disarmament of Europe, moral or material. The English official view counts on the assuaging influence of time. It reckons too little on the persistence of the French tradition of supremacy. It speculates too boldly on a very doubtful working of incalculable psychical factors, and gives, without securing a certain or adequate return. To me at least it seems that to guarantee the French frontier before the French armies have withdrawn behind it, is to gamble with all the chances against us. The occupation of the Rhineland is a daily provocation. It daily fosters sentiments of revenge, and if those feelings should one day be translated into acts, could any of us say that they were "unprovoked"?

This is not, even yet, the typical English view. It is the view of the Labor party, the view of the London Nation, and, I think it is also substantially the view of the Manchester Guardian, though it writes with much more caution and restraint. No pact at all with France would be popular in England, and any pact which looked like an alliance would be deeply unpopular. France in the vulgar phrase has "got on our nerves." She is losing her few partisans, and even the Times criticizes her and publishes disconcerting revelations. The Genoa policy is popular, but few of us look forward to any substantial achievement, for already we see France coming forward, as she did at Washington, with her veto on the most hopeful lines of advance. It must not discuss the indemnity. It must not touch politics. But how can one make even a beginning in economic reconstruction, how can one solve even the currency question, if the indemnity is ruled out from the discussion? The ban on politics might forbid the recognition of Russia, and certainly it is meant to exclude Mr. Lloyd George's somewhat vague but possibly helpful conception of a general pact against aggression. I have heard even Conservatives—one of them a publicist of considerable influence—express the hope that France will stay away from Genoa, and permit the

rest of us to advance without her. That, however, is impossible. We cannot touch the indemnity till she consents, nor would a recognition of Russia bear much fruit, unless it bound her to desist from her incessant intrigues against the Soviet Republic. The chief gain from recognition, if it were general and sincere, would be that it might make Moscow secure enough to risk the disbandment of the Red army, and the abolition of the Extraordinary Commission. But till France makes peace, Moscow can never feel secure. Genoa cannot make an epoch. At the best it will be tentative and a beginning. Though it sounds a harsh saying, my own growing conviction is that the best hope for us lies in the dawning perception among Frenchmen that they are isolated. When they do at length realize that, when they perceive that they have puzzled America, offended England, angered Italy and lost something of their recent ascendancy even in Poland and the Allied East, they may at last come to the conviction that their numerical inferiority to Germans and Russians demands even now some revision of policy. That is impossible while M. Poincaré is at the helm. It may be impossible till the present Chamber has lived through the further two years of its mandate. Ruin has a long start, and our tragedy is that in the race to overtake it, we must move in step.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

London.

Salvation vs. Guns in West Virginia

SENATOR KENYON'S report on West Virginia is out at last. Miners in the mountains will stick their noses more eagerly into that part of it which deals with the mine guard system than anything else.

The entrenched mine guards, with their shock troops of Baldwin-Felts detectives, interest a good many union miners down there. Eight or ten thousand at least; those who marched from Marmet in an "army" last August. They were a decent lot, if the citizens of West Virginia mining towns are decent. For the whole community was there, excepting children and women; and the women were represented in the "Red Cross" nurses who rode in the jitneys with the doctors. The army made a point of decency; booze was barred, rigidly; still, several men were loosely killed during the mobilization.

Some came on their own, with the family rifle. Others had new high-powers, bought with money

"found" in their local union's treasury. All had one idea,—"The mine guards; the Baldwin-Feltses; they gotta go." At least I could find no other objective during several hours' marching and chatting with the army; the killing of Sid Hatfield, a fortnight before, was on every tongue. As to method, however, they were divided. Some thought the idea was that their own rifles were to finish the guards and detectives in Logan county. Others called the armed march a demonstration; talked about "John Brown starting something once."

When Keeney and Mooney, the union district chiefs, booted and spurred into action at 4 A. M. by General Bandholtz, U. S. A., motored faster than General Sheridan and cried "turn, boys, turn," the army plumped for the idea that the business was demonstration, not extermination. They turned (until the mine guards attacked their rear, when they turned again; result, deaths and federal troops.) Their belief became, and has been, that brother miners were to be saved from the guard system by outsiders. Salvation was to come from the Senate. Their eyes were directed, away from their Boston tea-party, far off to the House of Lords.

The Senate Committee on Labor and Education had been instructed two months before to "make a thorough and complete investigation" of the year-old West Virginia struggle. After the miners' march Chairman Kenyon and another member looked into the mining towns and the committee held hearings in Washington, skimpily reported in the press. A good many pages of testimony deal with the mine guards; especially with witness Lively, the Baldwin-Felts detective, experienced strike breaker in Colorado, member of the union in West Virginia, officer in it and convention delegate, in the open with a smoking gun when Hatfield and Chambers were shot, and all the while drawing \$225 a month as a spy. Gentlemen were surprised.

SENATOR McKELLAR: Do you mean to say that you were vice president of the local lodge of the union while you were acting in the employ of the detective agency?

LIVELY: Yes, sir. . . .

MR. AVIS (for the operators): He has that right. That is the method practiced by the Department of Justice.

SENATOR McKELLAR: I certainly hope that it is not practiced by the Department of Justice. I would feel much more against the Department of Justice.

MR. AVIS: I think that is practiced in every department at Washington. . . .

SENATOR McKELLAR: I will say that it violates every idea of right that I ever had. I never would

have believed that a thing like this would happen, and I am not surprised that you are having trouble down there in Mingo County.

Well, two-and-two have made four for a good many years. A decade ago the U. S. Industrial Relations Commission exposed the under-cover agencies and mine guards. Renewed investigations with full details have been published in the past two years, with under-cover documents by the hundred. A year ago this same Senate committee, at a hearing for the Interchurch Commission of Inquiry, listened to vigorous urging that the industrial detective system be abolished and its connection with the Department of Justice be investigated. Finally, the sanctification of senatorial belief rests upon two-and-two.

In Senator Kenyon's report the mine guards get forty-three lines.

This report is a high-water mark; the crest of the liberal wave in the government pond. It formulates a code of industrial principles, deserving of the fullest public discussion. Most of the report's twenty-six pages trace the development of the code, from the Coal Commission of 1902, through the National War Labor Board, the British Industrial Conference, the Interchurch Conference, President Wilson's two conferences and the 1920 transportation law. Its author virtually says, "The West Virginia struggle is too savage, both sides too arrogant, for any remedy except education,—the legislation of a code and an enlightened public opinion back of it." The report begins the education; it is a pamphlet for Senators. Even the committee couldn't agree and the Chairman writes his lone report and hopes "that Senators may read it and think about it in connection with the bill which may be subsequently proposed."

And the bill? Three days after he reports, President Harding nominates the leader of the farm bloc to be a federal judge and Senator Kenyon, gazing at his colleagues, finds them not reading his pamphlet but confirming him by acclamation for a job far from Washington. So now it is Judge Kenyon. Also it is Baldwin-Felts in West Virginia and machine guns around the coal tipples.

The forty-three lines tell the miner what he knew before.

The system of paying deputy sheriffs out of funds contributed by the operators . . . is a vicious and un-American policy and a practice that should cease. . . . It is rather freely admitted that the purpose of this plan is to prevent men coming into the county to organize the United Mine Workers. Men have been driven out of the county who attempted so to do. . . . Un-

doubtedly this system has helped to bring about some of the friction that has been created. We do not hesitate to denounce this practice as contrary to the genius and spirit of our institutions and to urge that it be discontinued. . . . There is complete industrial autocracy in Logan county. Members of the United Mine Workers of America are driven out of the county by force, if necessary. The operators of that county contributed in 1920 \$46,630 to the payment of deputy sheriffs. The year 1921 it was \$61,517. These deputy sheriffs acted as general deputy sheriffs, serving processes around the county and arresting men who had no connection with the operators' companies. . . . Mr. Chafin, sheriff, Logan County, testifies there were 42 deputy sheriffs to be paid by donations of the operators. That this system has existed since at least the middle of 1912. We have the astounding situation of deputy sheriffs performing general duties of deputy sheriffs in the county, and not merely defending property of their employers, paid by contributions from the operators. It is amazing that anyone would seek to defend such a condition.

It is amazing that anyone would seek to end such a condition by orderly process; so the mountaineer-miner may conclude. The non-union coal,—to break a strike and to reduce 500,000 men's wages,—is held by guns. The guns are indefensible; but the guns are.

"What price salvation now?"

HEBER BLANKENHORN.

The Four Bare Apple Trees

Four bare apple trees
Walk through the fields,
Seeking the sun
To beg covering.

The rain comes along
With the wind at heel
Teaches the trees
To stand quite still!

The rain sings a song,
While the wind snuffs around;
The four bare apple trees
Tingle underground!

A-blaze! comes the sun,
The trees jump pleading!
The sun chides gently
There! Stand steady!

The moon makes a sign,
Robins come flocking
To four apple trees
Clothed and blushing!

Rain is the nurse now,
Apple-tree the mother;
Wind is the errand
Running brother!

JEANNETTE DERBY.

Great Britain: from Cannes to Genoa

GREAT BRITAIN lives on her exports. Her vital trade is in a similar condition to that of northern France. Nearly two million workmen are without work, which means that nearly one-sixth of the entire population is in distress; and their maintenance is costing the Government about £2,000,000 a week. Income tax stands at the appalling figure (appalling to those who have to pay it) of 6/- in the £; Englishmen being more heavily taxed than any other men in the world. It is a circle, in which strangling income-tax and stagnant trade go viciously round, playing each other's game.

Mr. Lloyd George is hovering on the brink of a general election. He knows that the industrial north is thinking in terms of economics, and that the industrial north is the deciding voice economically in the country. Therefore he went to Cannes and with the opening of the year unfolded a plan which would appeal to the industrial north. Not that his foreign policy need be thought to be dictated primarily by the ballot box, although such a charge (if it is a charge) could be readily answered on democratic grounds. It does happen to be the case that in its economic aspect Mr. Lloyd George's foreign policy has been remarkably consistent since the Armistice. In the khaki election of 1918 he was returned to power with the mandate of hanging the Kaiser and making Germany pay. Looking ahead and presumably realizing that in three years' time the hardheaded north, if it thought of the Kaiser and his golden reparations at all, would do so with increasing exasperation as of red herrings across the path of economic recovery, he decided boldly to ignore his election pledges and to work for economic restoration. At the very beginning of the peace conference in Paris, in January 1919 (exactly three years ago) he brought down upon his head the vituperation of his countrymen by proposing that the Allies should meet the Russians—the Bolshevik Russians—in conference. It was in vain that the rendezvous proposed was the outlandish island of Prinkipo. The proposal had to be dropped. The British jingoes and the French bondholders had won. But now the project is revived with more chance of success. Let it be remembered by Mr. Lloyd George's enemies that he has never let his original intention be driven from his head. Failing to induce his countrymen to meet the Russians on the island of Prinkipo in 1919, he brought the Russians to London in 1920, again in the teeth of op-

position from the Conservative element in his Coalition Ministry. He concluded a trading agreement in 1921. At Cannes in 1922 he carried unanimously in the Supreme Council an unconditional invitation to the Soviet Government to send representatives to a pan-European Conference to be held at Genoa on March 8th. And the overwhelming opinion of his own electorate approved.

There is no doubt that the Genoa Conference, as conceived by Mr. Lloyd George at Cannes, represents one of the great ambitions of Mr. Lloyd George's career. Having in the sphere of home affairs safely landed (*absit omen!*) an Irish settlement, he turned to new worlds abroad. He had been greatly impressed by the Washington Conference, and has allowed it to be gathered that he has perhaps been even a little jealous. Speaking in London after the Cannes Conference, on January 21st, he said: "The Washington Conference is establishing peace in the great West, and I am looking to the Genoa Conference to establish peace in the East. They will be like the two wings of the Angel of Peace hovering over the world."

Genoa will be an adventure. Already the difficulties have started, in advance. It happens that the British Government, unlike most of the contemporary governments in Europe, has a definite object in view. From the British point of view the European problem is simple in the sense that the only effective solution is clearly marked out, although the way to it be beset with difficulties. British opinion in its great majority is firm about it. Party issues, such as they are, do not greatly affect the solidity of the national will which lies behind the program of the Government as outlined at Cannes and as destined for trial at Genoa. Labor opinion is rallied by the general progressive tone of that programme, especially as it affects Russia; the "Wee Frees" or Independent Liberals, finding that the Coalition Government in its foreign policy is 99% Liberal and 1% Conservative, choose to make their platforms at home; the Conservatives recognize the economic significance of 6/- in the £ and two million unemployed; it is true that there are a handful of mediaeval Tories in the country, who read the *Morning Post* and who think that economics are a horrid modern invention. They are a dwindling, though charming, minority, and do not affect the generalization that the country is behind the Prime Minister in the broad lines of his foreign policy.

I. THE END OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL

Criticism has been made in those American circles which are most sympathetic and understanding of the present situation in Europe, that God helps those who help themselves. Good Europeans can hardly be edifying as a spectacle for benevolent outsiders. The king of continents ought to have more sense. In the *New Republic's* Handbook to the Washington Conference (Roads to Peace) Mr. Herbert Croly wrote: "Before it can accept American aid with safety or profit, Europe must mitigate its domestic animosities and dissensions. European recovery is primarily a European problem. It will take a European Conference, in which Germany and Russia are represented as equals, to engineer the work." In November 1921 Mr. Croly expressed in a nutshell the British policy for Genoa in March 1922.

Genoa is an entirely British proposal, so far as Europe is concerned. It involves the virtual end of the Supreme Council as the deciding executive authority in postwar Europe, the abdication of its authority to a European Conference, at which Germans and Russians will sit as equals among equals. At Cannes I had an opportunity of asking Mr. Lloyd George whether I was right in interpreting his proposal as a scheme for a real association of European nations, such as had been suggested by, and would certainly appeal to, sympathetic Americans, designed to put Europe on her legs again, and possibly inaugurating a more or less continuous organization. He confirmed the impression.

II. GENOA AND THE EXISTING LEAGUE OF NATIONS

There were representatives of the Geneva League of Nations at Cannes, not taking part in the deliberations, but hovering on the fringe, watching. Their judgment was clearly right when they foresaw that the Genoa Conference, as projected at Cannes, assuming it to be a success, would precipitate an issue between Genoa and Geneva. For the League of Nations, which was born of the original peace conference at Paris, was theoretically driving at the very objects marked out for Genoa. Was there to be a pacific race between the two? Informal conversations took place at Cannes with the object of discovering some method of roping in the League of Nations; for it would be a mistake to assume that Mr. Lloyd George ignores the existence of the League. No British Prime Minister could. The moral backbone of the League is to be found in the enthusiasm of the League of Nations Union, inspired and controlled by Lord Robert Cecil from London. It

has a big following, especially but not exclusively among the Wee Frees and Nonconformists. If only from the point of view of the impending election, no British Government would be so foolish as to estrange an important mass of British opinion. But the problem proved too difficult. As Mr. Lloyd George explained at Cannes, the whole point of the Genoa Conference was to reabsorb Russia and Germany into the European family of nations, as a preliminary to the solid settlement of Europe. Both countries were outside the League, and "for some reason or other, Russia was hostile to the League." Moreover it was regarded as important, so far as the British Government was concerned, to enlist the interest and approval of the United States of America, in the hope that Genoa would build a twin prop with Washington to reconstruct the world. The League again, most unfortunately, could contribute little in this sense. There seemed therefore no alternative to making Genoa independent of the League. The British Government hopes that Genoa and Geneva may flourish side by side, in kindred work. None the less outside observers fear that the position is not so simple. There are two organizations doing work on an international scale in Europe today. One is the League, the other Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Lloyd George is delivering the goods, such as they are. The League cannot. Why? It is no fault of the League's that it was born in the atmosphere of the Paris Conference, a maimed one-sided infant, crippled from birth. But the British section of the League Secretariat has from the beginning been keenly in favor of remedial measures, and had its influence not been neutralized by French opposition, Germany and Russia would long ago have been grafted on to the League, for its better health. And, ask the supporters of the League, what better opportunity could have been devised for the realization of such a step, than the Genoa Conference? Granted that the League in its present form is only half a League. Even so it is doing work on a small but increasing scale, and is being used more and more, for instance, by the British Government, which often dumps upon it difficult problems. And the very nature of the constitution of the League is such that it admits of amendment. But the Leaguers have lost their case, for the moment at any rate, suffering for the evil which lives after the Big Four of Paris—among whom is Mr. Lloyd George himself, as is recalled bitterly. It is hard to answer the argument of the League's own record during the past year. It is there shown that while the League may be effective in problems of secondary importance, it

fails when the problem on hand touches directly the interests or sentiments of any Great Power. The threat of Article 16 of the Covenant made the Jugoslavs withdraw from Albania in the late autumn; but for a whole year the Poles have flouted the League, merely because Poland had an alliance with France. Only the other day the League finally threw up the sponge, and admitted its inability to decide the fate of Vilna. So the League will not participate in the Genoa Conference.

III. FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

France has a tremendous responsibility at the present time. It is in her power to wreck the Genoa Conference. On January 6th, when the Lloyd Georgian resolution was carried, the prospect in Europe was clearer than it had been since the armistice. Within a week M. Briand fell. It had been realized at first in French quarters that the Cannes resolution implied a military holiday, which in its turn would logically imply disarmament, including the abandonment of big submarine programmes, the abdication of the Supreme Council, the substitution of a better deciding authority, and in general a reversion to the pre-war normal atmosphere of peace. When M. Poincaré protests, as he now protests, against the régime of the Supreme Council in Europe, simple observers unacquainted with the complications of European squabbles, might think that he was thereby supporting the Genoa idea. Not at all. He objects to all conferences, because the Lloyd Georgian influence which finds scope therein, uses them as a means to the elimination of the war distinction between enemies and allies. Genoa by this token is even more distasteful to M. Poincaré than the Supreme Council.

The great difficulty is that France, looking for security and reparations, sees no other chance of getting them than by continuing for as long as possible the tactics of the dog fight, in which the Allies, including France, are top dog, and Germany is bottom dog. Great Britain is of decided opinion that such a policy defeats its object. She suggests to France that she should make up her mind whether she wants to get reparations from Germany or to destroy Germany. It is an old argument. To American observers it will no doubt seem odd that this Franco-British controversy should continue. Fundamentally the interests of the two countries are the same. Although the immediate manifestation of their respective needs takes the form of military security and reparations in the case of France, and European trade and pacification in the case of Great Britain, it is at least arguable that the two things are sides of the

same medal. If diplomacy cannot build a bridge over the British Channel before March 8th, European diplomacy will indeed be bankrupt, and other continents will be justified in exercising their scorn. So far as the British Government is concerned, it is realized that French participation at Genoa is essential for success. There can be no chance of economic restoration or political balance so long as France can hold out the threat of a Ruhr invasion. The fundamental identity of French and British interests is so obvious to British minds that sooner or later an accommodation is regarded as inevitable, the danger being that unless the accommodation is reached now, Genoa may fail, and European recovery may be indefinitely postponed.

IV. RUSSIA

Take Russia. The whole difference between the French and British Governments on this head is one of form, and a quibble at that. At Cannes Mr. Lloyd George regarded it as important that the Russians should be invited to Genoa unconditionally. In the resolution he carried his point. In the speech which he made, and in conversation with M. Briand, he however made it perfectly clear that there can be no two opinions, so far as Great Britain is concerned, as to what ought to be the conditions precedent to the admission of Russia again into the family of European nations. The British people have an old constitution, which they respect; they have certain well-defined tenets of good form in government, one of the basic principles being the continuity of national obligation as incurred by successive administrations. No Englishman would ever advocate the recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia as the legal government of Russia except on the condition that the Soviet on its side recognized its liability for the obligations of Russian government. That is to say, either the administration of Lenin, Trotsky and company has taken over Russia as a concern, or not. If it has, then it takes over the liabilities as well as the assets. The political and the economic aspect of the question, as is generally the case, are identical. Great Britain is a nation of business men, and Britain is dependent on foreign trade for its life. The foundation of business is security; security is based on confidence; confidence means the virtual certainty that one's debtors will pay. The Russian Soviet Government has repudiated the national debt. There is only one way in which Russia can regain the confidence of the outside business world. No trader is again going to sink capital or deliver goods in Russia unless his security is repaired. It goes without saying that Great Britain will insist, quite as

strong as France or as any other normal body of people, that Russia must recognize her debts, both on political grounds as a condition of *de jure* recognition by the Powers, and on economic grounds as a condition of the restarting of trade. All this has been pointed out to France, and Mr. Lloyd George dotted the i's of it at Cannes. There is no difference in principle.

What then is the difficulty? It simply is that Mr. Lloyd George believes in diplomacy by conference as the means to the end. The Irish representatives, sitting round a table at No. 10 Downing Street with representatives of the British Government, achieved what never could have been achieved by the exchange of notes between Dublin and London. M. Poincaré hates conferences. He would rather, as he has said, revert to the pre-war methods of diplomatic communication, precise and leisurely consideration, definite development in writing. This clash of temperament between M. Poincaré and Mr. Lloyd George, on whom more than on any two other people depends the chance of rescuing Europe from chaos, is by far the most serious thing in the present situation. In this world causes weigh lightly in the balance against personalities. There is of course much to be said for the Poincaré method in normal times. These are not normal times. At Cannes, as if foreseeing and anticipating the Poincaré accession to power, Mr. Lloyd George said: "No useful object is served by forwarding conditions in writing to Moscow. It is most important to deal if possible direct with the heads of the Russian Government, and the conference should be held as soon as possible at the most suitable centre for that purpose."

V. THE MILITARY PACT

Another difficulty is that of the military pact and reparations. Here again, in the opinion of the British Government, there is no essential divergence of interest between London and Paris. France wants security for the future, and German gold and goods for the present. Great Britain is prepared to help her in both quests. In 1914 Britain went to the help of France even without a written and definite pact or alliance. She would do so again in similar circumstances, even in her own interest. With a written pact the difference would be that Germany would be effectively deterred from attempting any sort of *revanche*. Peace is the thing that matters most. The evidence goes to show that Germany would not have attacked France in 1914 if she had known that Great Britain would go to the help of France, and had further known that the contemptible little

expeditionary force of six divisions from England in 1914 was not the limit of the British Empire's capacity. During the last two years of the war, the British Empire maintained 2,000,000 men in France and Flanders, and her total contribution in man power was 6,211,427. If with such a background a military guarantee by Great Britain to France is likely to insure peace, then Britain gives it gladly, subject of course to the approval of the dominions, who are equals among equals in the British commonwealth. The motive of British foreign policy is pacifist. That is the only reason why Britain offers France a military pact.

VI. POLITICAL PACIFICATION

While Great Britain offers security to France against unprovoked attack, she will not under any consideration enter blindly into a military alliance, such as M. Poincaré has so far hankered after, which would drag Great Britain at the heels of France in any mad militarist enterprise she might decide on in a moment of excitement. Of course not. The object is peace. Similarly Great Britain points out that there can be no satisfactory arrangement between France and Great Britain unless France in her turn is prepared to play the British game by agreeing to a quick settlement all along the line, politically and economically, in Europe and the Near East. A conference had been arranged to take place in Paris after the Cannes Conference, for the settlement of the Near East. Lord Curzon, who had been at Cannes, impatiently waiting for his own turn in Paris, found the wind taken out of his sails by the fall of M. Briand. It happened that he, alone of all the Allied Foreign Ministers who were to meet in Paris, had a policy to propose for the Near East. In its broad lines it did not differ much from the London proposals of last March. It involved the withdrawal of the Greek army and administration from the Smyrna zone, the maintenance of nominal Turkish sovereignty there, but with a local autonomous administration, and with safeguards for the Christian minorities of Asia Minor, both inside and outside the zone. But Briand fell. Lord Curzon went to Paris hoping against hope that M. Poincaré would not spoil the Near Eastern Conference, as he had spoiled the Cannes Conference. A short interview convinced him that there was no hope, and he returned to London disconsolate.

VII. REPARATIONS

It only remains to place the problem of reparations in its perspective with the general problem.

of economic recovery in Europe. For two years the British Government has been urging the relegation of reparations into a position of secondary importance to the recovery of Europe. France has never agreed. Strange as it may seem, the French have never really understood the British attitude on reparations, although it has been a more frequent subject of heart-to-heart talks between Paris and London than any other. The British attitude is quite simple. There is no sentimental desire to let off Germany from the payment of her war bill, provided the payment of it does not hurt the receiver. Experience has so far proved that in the matter of reparations it is more blessed to give than to receive; but this Shakespearian irony is due to the fact that France has attempted the somewhat unpractical feat of making Germany pay and of making her physically incapable of paying at one and the same time. The main sufferer from this perversion has been, not Germany but Great Britain, whose two million unemployed, 6/- in the £ and devastated trade are the outward and visible signs of the price she has paid and is paying.

Now if, on the other hand, France consents to a scheme for the general convalescence of Europe, inclusive of Germany, Central and South-Eastern Europe, all will be well, even from the French point of view, on reparations. What Great Bri-

tain suffers from is stagnation of trade due to the loss of her markets in Central and Eastern Europe, that loss itself being due to the French perpetuation of the war division into two hostile camps, coupled with the uncertain and demoralizing effect of restive French troops on the Rhine. Granted the need of this state of affairs, France will find that one of the chief advocates of Germany's paying up to the limit of her capacity is Great Britain herself. If Germany is given a fair chance, and is placed in a position which enables her to pay, through the recapture of her own markets in Central Europe, then what reason is there why Germany should not pay, any less than Russia should shoulder her obligations, or Great Britain? Great Britain is the only country in the world which is paying her war debts or war indemnities (which are the same thing). She is doing so by means of the heaviest income tax known in any country. While Germany is essential to the recovery of British commercial prosperity, she happens also to be a competitor. British business men may be sentimental, but they are hardly so foolish as to go out of their way to enable a competitor to start in the race free from all encumbrances, while themselves shouldering heavy burdens due in the first place to the crimes of that very competitor himself.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

VARIATIONS ON A MODERN THEME

By Louis Untermeyer

The Time-Space Jazz

By VACH-L LIN-SAY

I

When Lincoln was a little boy,
In Springfield,
Illinois,
The land was torn with slavery
and dissension.

Fort Sumter had not fallen to the foe.
No one would dare discuss the fourth dimension.
Uncle Tom's Cabin came to Mrs. Stowe.
Commodore Perry started for Japan.
The Whigs now dubbed themselves Republican.
Stephen A. Douglas, called "The Little Giant,"
Brought fire and civil war to bleeding Kansas.
John Brown and his three sons became defiant.
Whittier dreamed and wrote his deathless stanzas.
But, though the heart of truth was beating there,
Transfusing all the air,
There was no beauty, fantasy or joy,
In Springfield,
Illinois.

*To be intoned
in a heavy
baritone with
a touch of
pomposity.*

II

And now today,
When Science holds its mighty sway,
On Springfield corners and in Springfield streets,
Where'er the village passion beats,
In lowly chapels or electric signs,
The new gods have their shrines.
John L. Sullivan and old Walt Whitman,
Mark Twain, Roosevelt, Waldo Emerson,
Pocahontas and Booth and Bryan,
Einstein, with prophecies of space and Zion—
Their names are spelled in characters of light,
Their names are legends;
Their names are glory;
Their names are blazoned on the sky at night.
Their spirits strengthen every blade of grass,
The lost souls rise and cheer them when they pass,
Star-hearted Lucifer takes off his hat,
Saints so holy are prostrated flat.
Daniel and his lions do a rag-
time dance;

Oratorically.

*With a slight
suggestion of
"Roll dem
Cotton Bales."*

Jazz-jumping angels have to shout and prance.
Adam and Eve learn the snake-dance there;
Old Elisha does the toddle with the bear.
All creation is a-swaying to and fro—

Andrew Jackson comes with Old
Black Joe,
Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego . . .

With increasing speed and energy.

While the tune of the spheres is a cosmic Kallyope,
Bringing hope, bringing hope, bringing hope, bringing hope,
Singing joy, singing joy, singing joy,
To every heart that still may grope
In Springfield,
Illinois.

Einstein

By EDW-N MARK-AM

We drew our circle that shut him out,
This man of Science who dared our doubt;
But ah, with a fourth dimensional grin,
He squared a circle that took us in!

East is West: And the Great World Shrinks

By AMY LOW-LL

Tlop—tlop—clatter—clatter! "Hi there, stop! What's the matter? Have you gone mad that you clash against the pages and lash your verbs and nouns in hot rages of sounds. Zounds!" cries the astounded reader. "Are there no laws for such a speeder? Will she never pause as her sixty-horse power Pegasus courses madly on the earth here or the sky there? Hi, there!"

But the warning is vain. The intrepid rider, scorning conventions, is out of hearing. Clearing the three dimensions of space, her racer thunders sonorously out of Boston and is lost in new flights over Peru. Ascending and tossed in smoke, it flirts with what Mary Austin calls 'our Amerind folk-lore'. It soars over the parched wall of China; skirts the starched borders of eighteenth century artifice; skips to the balladists' Middle Ages; burns through the pallid pages of sages, and returns, as unwearied as when it hastened forth, to north of Brookline and Points Adjacent. The abused beast never trips although the Muse applies the whip remorselessly. The poor horse flies as though each poem were a gruelling race; his slowest pace is a canter, at best. He dares not rest. . . .

Everything fares the same; it shares this unrelieved tension. At the mention of a name, of an enamel-studded frieze, budded fruit trees or flower gardens—everything suddenly hardens, shoots, flames, spins, turns and burns with an almost savage intensity. Nature seems to have lost its usual stature; it becomes an immense contrapuntal series of frontal attacks; an unrelaxed assault of suns that clang like gongs, clouds that crash and splinter, boughs that clash and rouse their roots, a lark that "shoots up like a popgun ball." . . . It is all rigorously fortissimo, enthralling in its vigor; appallingly energetic. . . .

Musically alone, the tones of it are full of uncanny changes. A strange and unearthly symphony is heard here; queer tympani add their blows to this polyphonic prose. There is the patter of clicking bones and the quick, dry chatter of xylophones, the hiss of tambourines, the cymbals' shivering kiss, the high quiver of triangles, the clack and mutter of drum-sticks tapping on slackened guts.

And colors! Nothing duller than bright blue, new white, light green of an almost obscene brilliance. Millions of reds and purples that blaze and splutter. Buttercup-yellow and iris-tinted fires that mellow the polished sides of space. . . . One fades, and fresh shades spring up

in its place. Jades—like the wings of a dragonfly resting on young lily-pads. Crimson—like the tongue of carmine that skims on the tips of rusty peonies. Lilac—with the faint dust that slips over the wistaria blossoms. Silver as magnolias stroked by moonlight, blue-mauve, dove-gray, livid azaleas, fire-ball dahlias . . . all of them shouting their vivid promises. Let the doubting Thomases scatter their seeds of distrust. Matter is matter. Who needs further affirmation? Let the stars shatter themselves, heedless of gravitation; there is an end even to infinity. Straight lines bend not only in a poet's rhymes. Times have changed. Science is ranged on the side of the singer who has learned to distort the widely assorted phenomena of life. Circles are no longer round. Sound can be seen. Light can be weighed. Black is made white; the last has come first. The worst, one thinks, may be the best. East is West: and the great world shrinks.

Love's Relativity

By S-RA TEASD-LE

The moon is in love with the nightingale,
And the nightingale worships the rose;
But the red rose bleeds for the young and pale
Queen of the garden close.

The young queen turns to a singing clown
Whose lips have a single tune;
She leans to him like a ray bent down . . .
But he is in love with the moon.

Miss Doris Keane

The Czarina, a comedy in three acts, by Melchior Lengyel and Lajos Biró, translated and adapted by Edward Sheldon. The Empire Theatre, January 31, 1922.

TALENT, I think, is ultimately a thing of the body. It goes back ultimately to the body as music does to the eardrum and the nerves of hearing. And it is an immediate thing. To those who have eyes for it talent is discernible at once when it comes on the stage, for it establishes a kind of luminosity of the presence, a radiance of the body seen to be living out the moment there. Talent gives an important continuity to the person, and makes not only true but necessary Mrs. Fiske's remark—quoted in Mr. Alexander Woollcott's delightful book—that the greatest actors have in a sense always acted themselves. But what talent may be, with all its separability, vividness, vitality and magnetism, it is impossible to say or to define, because like all natural things, like all things that are a part of nature itself, talent is inexpressible and can alone convey itself completely to us. But it may at least be said that talent has, after all, a mysterious difference from mere capacity for hard work, though work perfects it and frees it to be its essential self. And it differs from intention, however earnest; for it is an organic thing—to take a term from science—as distinguished from inorganic; it is a part of the structure, the organism, the living tissue of the person who possesses it rather than something to be taken on, desired, and labored at. Mr. Carroll at the Neighborhood Playhouse has talent, small or large, because from the moment he comes on the stage his body takes on a reality in terms of the stage. And it is her talent that distinguishes Miss Doris Keane from so many of our honestly persistent actresses, Miss Elsie Ferguson for example, who in spite of the rich persuasion of her beauty

has no talent to speak of at all. It is only Miss Keane's talent that makes it worth while to discuss the production of *The Czarina* with any serious regard, or to think of it as anything but a vivacious diversion, fairly well acted, in a sumptuous setting and pretty clothes.

I remember several years ago seeing Miss Keane as the prima donna in Edward Sheldon's *Romance*, a facile and sugared bit of theatrical goods, tinted with Clyde Fitch's Captain Jinks of the Horse Marines, but engaging enough in its way. I remember how startled I was. There was a real talent. To begin with there was a voice that went straight to its objective, and was, besides, the only case I have ever heard in our theatre of the exact reproduction of a certain Italian characteristic in the tone. There was a fine plastic gift, a beautiful use of the hands, an actress with a beautiful flowing movement across the stage when she walked, an urgent and compelling pantomime. An actress with intelligence, with droll pungency.

I could not be persuaded that a talent like this could be obscured, though it might be dulled by playing away at the same prima donna's blowing herself up with glory and then letting herself down into a pious end every night for nine years. And at the Empire now this gift is not obscured. In the midst of endless inequality of effect and intention, of uncertain genre and mood, of a still open decision as to the kind of voice to be adopted for Catherine, and of a play that sags heavily in the middle, Miss Keane's quality appears. The sudden, startling vivacity of tone leaps out in a speech now and then like a red bird out of the shadows; the laugh when the French Ambassador tells a naughty incident from Monsieur Voltaire's *Candide* cuts like a bright whip across the moment, the wrists are eloquent in their lines, and the crackle of wits and spirit darts into any little passage where the play gives the brain a chance. And yet Miss Keane does not give a complete performance of her part, not much more complete at present than the general production of the play around her is complete.

The great Catherine of Russia as sheer raw material has always been a little stiff for the mind of Western Europe. This tremendous power and energy working its ends in countries and men, this magnetic personality and physical dominance, this intelligence, curiosity and insolence and brutality, make up a combination, which, however impressive or mad or superb or successful it might have been in what it wrought out of life, is, at the least, disturbing to our scheme of things, to our chart of virtuous qualities and conduct. It has seemed best to take Catherine a little comically.

Byron in his *Don Juan* has carried the subject farther than anyone else has done, and with more verve and sophistication and sly power. The general theme that Byron chose to underlie the whole of his *Don Juan* was, as he put it, the vindication of the natural man; by which he meant to imply that when a glowing section of life in all its candid charm and naturalism appeared in the person of *Don Juan*, the frail props of the conventional went down before him; the veneer that we have laid so carefully over the surface of respectable living, cracks and nakes way for nature. And *Don Juan's* encounter with Catherine supplies a double variation on the theme, Greek meets Greek, and careful civilization goes whistling down the wind, with the send-off of all the wit and irony and brilliance that Byron can muster. Bernard Shaw in *The Great Catherine* makes up his impish matter out of bold barbarism and blunt Teutonism and French wit and

English prudery and dullness, and builds out of it one of the most delicious satirical comedies in the world. But *The Czarina* by these Hungarian dramatists and Mr. Sheldon cannot be said to keep to any such pace. How much Mr. Sheldon has changed and softened it and pinked it up with Broadway appeal I have no way of knowing, or how many of those soiled guffaws that come up from the audience are due to him. But as it stands the play lacks pretty much any given quality; it comes to almost nothing because it is never seen, never centralized, never dominated. It never decided to be anything in particular at all. It is an empty work bitten by the reality of a distinguished character that history supplied and shaken out of its jobbing indifference by the ferocity and shock of this character. And the third act turns out to be more important than the rest largely because the piling up of the mere business of these stage puppets pulls the house down about their ears.

But even as it stands the play could be made more of a unit. Miss Keane ought to make up her mind on what she means her Catherine to be, if she means anything but a long run; and then play the part as gaily, as passionately and as whimsically as she likes. At present it is only a matter of spots. And at present Miss Keane's playing of it gives the impression of being too willing to oblige; she lets the effects go this way and that as it may happen to please the audience. "If you prick us do we not bleed? if you tickle us do we not laugh? and if you wrong us shall we not revenge?"—actors as well as Shylock may ask that. And the answer is, "Obviously, yes." But because they are human, are real in their humanity, not merely because we want them to laugh and bleed and revenge. If Miss Keane would do this, the other actors in the company, who are above the average as a group, could be brought into line—Mr. Frederick Kerr, the Chancellor, is already there, for his mood is consistent throughout, is wise, resignedly philosophical—if Miss Keane held her own as she sees it or learns to see it in the central character, the other actors would know where they stood, and would not play in and out of the whole as they now do, with wandering eyes on the audience—farce, romance, comedy, melodrama all on the stage at the same time. If Catherine were held properly and continuously together throughout the play the genuinely comic humor of the situation might emerge, which comes from all these people around her being thrown against this force that she is, a force so human, illogical and tempestuous, erratic and superb, that it shatters into jolly fragments the lesser egotisms and majesties and wiles and resolutions that are dashed against it. The victims do not ever see this farcically, though some of them are driven to regard it with the comic insight and the sweet reasonableness desirable for a society that relies for its comfort and welfare on safe and sane and conventional bounds. From all this—seen so clearly by Shaw and Byron—the comedy would arise. The romance would come from the fire and danger and risk of it all.

Miss Doris Keane can do this if she will. She has little to fear; her next-morning critics have agreed already that she was remarkable that first night; she has pleased them, now let her please herself, trusting her talent to find the way to a convincing unity. She should find her key and keep to it, should relate it to the continuity of her own personality; and so make the piece come straight for the actors and for the audience, and if necessary for the playwright as well.

STARK YOUNG.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Reply from Mr. Hudson

SIR: May I point out three features of your editorial reply to my criticism of your statement that "the League of Nations is bound hand and foot by the instrument, the Treaty of Versailles, which created it."

1. It withdraws your intimation that the "chief business" of the League is to "execute the Treaty of Versailles." Though the two years' record is clear to the contrary, that fallacious notion has been widely current among people who have not been in close touch with the work of the League, and I hope your withdrawal will help to dispel it.

2. It tacitly admits my contention that any general international conference at the present time would be "bound" by the peace treaties to the same degree that the League is "bound" by them, in the sense that they present certain important facts accomplished in addition to the formal obligations of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. I cited M. Briand's drawing the veil of the peace treaties over the proposal that the Washington Conference should deal with land armaments. Since my letter was written, we have had the testimony of Senators Lodge and Underwood, in the Senate on January 20th, that the Shantung question "cannot be taken up directly in the Conference" at Washington, because seven of the conferring powers had signed the Treaty of Versailles. I submit, therefore, that your chief reason for preferring a new association to the League falls to the ground. Intra-League or extra-League, America's approach to international politics cannot obliterate the attempts made in 1919 to settle our post-war problems.

3. It shifts your emphasis from "execution" to "revision" of the Treaty of Versailles. In the task of "revision," you conclude that it is wiser to ignore the League and to try and "call into existence . . . a new agency of conference," because the "pressure for revision must come from nations which have not signed the Treaty of Versailles or have signed it unwillingly." You mention the United States, Germany and Russia. We agree that the cooperation of the United States is essential. The question is, through what agencies shall we cooperate? Can "revision" be accomplished more easily and more wisely by the League *minus* the United States than by some other association which includes the United States? Clearly not. That is why Mr. Lloyd George prefers Genoa to Geneva. On so much we agree. But the issue is quite different—can "revision" be better accomplished by the League with the United States in its membership than by some other association with the United States in its membership? I think you do not meet this issue. You desire a "freer and more flexible" association than the present League. Freer from what? Does the New Republic want to leave out the fifty or more states which do not rank as great powers? And why is the present League not flexible enough? Again I appeal to its record extending over the last two years.

As for the participation of Germany and Russia, I would remind you that Germany is cooperating in many phases of the League's work. She sent delegates to the Labor Conferences at Genoa and Geneva, to the Financial Conference at Brussels, to the Communications Conference at Barcelona, to the White Slave Conference at Geneva and to the Aaland Islands Neutralization Conference at Geneva. Would she be less willing to cooperate in conferences for the "revision" of the Treaty? Surely not because they were assembled by the League, in which the "ex-neutrals" are given a voice. And her admission to full membership in the League, even in the Council of the League, ought to present less difficulty if the United States were there to insist on it. An invitation to Germany to attend any conference, whether it be held inside or outside the League, would need the assent of France if France were to be represented. Is that assent less difficult to obtain if the Conference is outside the League?

It is true that in 1920, in the days when Lenin and Tchitcherine were trying to secede from the non-communist world, the Soviet Government of Russia did refuse to cooperate with the League. Today their attitude might be less haughty. Certainly, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, in the Council of the League of Nations with Belgium, Brazil, China and Spain, could as easily decide to invite the Russians to a conference, as the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy

and Japan can take that decision, calling themselves a "Supreme Council" or a "De-Wilsonized Association of Great Powers." Indeed, the Soviet leaders might be less suspicious of the former invitation!

Now that the isolationists have been vanquished by the Washington Conference, the real issue before the American people is, indeed, "why conferences rather than the League?" What does the United States want to be the agency for its permanent co-operation? We must choose between (1) a permanent machinery for the manufacture and effectuation of consent through conference, now successfully functioning with the adherence of fifty-one peoples throughout the world; and (2) occasional, spasmodic, ad hoc conferences of some of the powers called by a few of the powers to suit their own convenience. You have not dealt with the importance of settling international disputes in cases like those of the Aaland Islands and Albania and Vilna. What do you propose for these, if America rejects the League? Nor have you dealt with the integration of more nearly normal international relations, in such fields as the control of the opium and white slave traffics and international labor legislation. How will spasmodic conferences do this job?

I have assumed that we could agree on a common meaning for "revision of the Treaty of Versailles." But I should like to enter a caveat against the uncertain range of your term. Perhaps you will give your readers its more definite content. For my part, I should deprecate any "revision" of territorial frontiers which would fan up new fires of Balkan chaos in Eastern Europe.

MANLEY O. HUDSON.

Mr. Beck Takes the Count

TO The Honorable James M. Beck: To the law mind Mr. Felix Frankfurter licked you to a finish in your mix-up with him in the New Republic "bowl." And now the lay mind looks forward with entire confidence (barring what confidence it may lack in its ability to identify a knock-out in a set-to by lawyers) to a second thrill, in your handsome admission of the licking. For already you've admitted you're gallant (indeed one gathers you have a hair-trigger "jealousy in honor") and, you know, the best test of gallantry is taking a licking gallantly.

We recognize that making the admission in your best form will be hard. For Mr. Frankfurter lacks, or in your case exercised it but little, the finesse, the elegance of a high-school fighter. He tears straight into an adversary and lands with staggering blows upon the seats of his vital punctilios, his fairness, his truthfulness, his reverence.

But you are supple, elusive. You feint and sidestep. Artfully you seek to divert your adversary's attention from your heart and stomach. For example you ask Mr. Frankfurter what he wrote about to a certain Bolshevik. By the way, there having been no word from you as to questionable romance in Mr. Frankfurter's life, it's strong negative testimony that there's been none.

You seek to get Mr. Frankfurter off onto the ground of the "American people's sweeping condemnation of the Wilson policies," the policy of getting us to help lick the Junker, wherefore all the Germans among us voted against him in 1918 and 1920, and the policies of blocking Italy's lust of land and of not taking up the cudgels for Ireland against England, wherefore the Irish and the Italians among us voted against him in 1920. Fatal policies—no doubt whatever of their above stated effects—but, what have they to do with the question of Mooney's retrial? And what has Mooney's having been an anarchist, as you say and as probably he was, to do with it?

Your answer is, of course, that it's the highest ring tactics, and it's on the nail. It's ring chatter, aiming to distract—"Kitchen cabinet," "Kindergarten Bolshevism"—just as if Dempsey were to have exclaimed excitedly during a round "Look back, George, your wife's fainted!"

Mr. Frankfurter's neglect of all these delicacies makes a handsome admission of a licking hard, no doubt, as being to one not in your class. Nevertheless you'll make it, we're sure, for the sake of clean sport.

W. E. MARTIN.

Omaha, Nebraska.

John Marshall

John Marshall and the Constitution, by Edward S. Corwin. Chronicles of America Series. New Haven: Yale University Press. \$5.00.

ALL those who have made the delightful journey through Beveridge's four volumes will be glad to compare his estimate of the mind and work of the Chief Justice with that of a distinguished student and teacher of political science. Despite the great merits of the longer biography, its uninterrupted eulogies occasionally give the impression that the former Senator from Indiana is placing before a national convention "that peerless statesman, John Marshall of Virginia," as a Presidential candidate. Professor Corwin supplements Beveridge's accounts of the historical backgrounds of Marshall's various important decisions by furnishing a critical judgment upon their legal significance and devoting much attention to the subsequent development of Marshall's constitutional principles. His comment on the Dartmouth College case is a good sample (page 169):

Perhaps, however, it will be argued that the real mischief of the decision has consisted in its effect upon the state Legislatures themselves, the idea being that large business interests, when offered the opportunity of obtaining irrevocable charters, have frequently found it worth their while to assail frail legislative virtue with irresistible temptation. . . . Yet, what is to be said of that other not uncommon incident of legislative history, the legislative 'strike,' whereby corporations not protected by irrevocable charters are blandly confronted with the alternative of having their franchises mutilated or of paying handsomely for their immunity? So the issue seems to resolve itself into a question of taste regarding two species of legislative 'honesty!' Does one prefer that species which, in the words of the late Speaker Reed, manifests itself in 'staying bought,' or that species which flowers in legislative blackmail? The truth of the matter is that Marshall's decision has been condemned . . . for evils which have been experienced quite as fully in other countries which never heard of the 'obligation of contracts' clause.

Corwin is not always so favorable. He stigmatizes Marshall's conduct of the Burr trial as "the one serious blemish on his judicial record," though extenuated by Jefferson's vindictiveness. Of the opinion directing Burr's acquittal, which Beveridge terms "a state paper of first importance," Corwin says, "Reputation is a great magician in transmuting heresy into accepted teaching." Only an expert in the law of treason can adjudicate this dispute, and the Burr trial will furnish an interesting passage in that unwritten treatise on the American law of treason, insurrection, and sedition, which ought soon to be called into existence by the great bulk of recent legislation and prosecutions against opposition to government. One wishes that Corwin had ventured a more decided opinion about Burr's guilt. He certainly does not share Beveridge's confident belief in his innocence. Did Burr himself know what he intended, or did he wander along the rivers, like Micawber, waiting for something to turn up?

One conclusion in this part of Corwin's book is questionable. Marshall held that it was not enough for the government to prove by two witnesses the occurrence of the supposedly treasonable assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island; since Burr was not there himself, it must also

produce two witnesses to establish the fact that he ordered the assemblage or conspired with others to bring it about. Corwin, after stating that the Common Law did not require such strong proof and that the logical result of Marshall's view is to prevent the procurer of treason from being a traitor unless he personally participates in an act of war, continues (page 110):

Such a result is monstrous, and what is more, it has not been found possible to adhere to it in practice. In recent legislation necessitated by the Great War, Congress has restored the old Common Law view of treason but has avoided the constitutional difficulty by labeling the offence 'Espionage.' Indeed, the Espionage act of June 15, 1917, scraps Marshall's opinion pretty completely.

Marshall's opinion is not on the ash-heap yet. He was not guarding us against legislative extension of the criminal law, but against a different and very real danger, the excesses of judges. English judges had stretched Parliament's definition of treason so as to send men to death for conduct which was of moderate danger to the state or which was proved by testimony too weak for the severity of the punishment. Therefore, he insisted that our Constitution prevented judges from treating such conduct and such testimony as constituting the crime of treason, punishable by death and forfeiture of property. He did not hold that it prevented Congress from punishing this less serious or less solidly proved conduct as a different kind of crime. Indeed, in an earlier opinion (*Ex parte Bollman*, 4 Cranch 127), he expressly stated the contrary:

It is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our Constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide.

Congress did not wait until 1917 to do this. During the Civil War it made incitement of insurrection punishable by ten years imprisonment, and conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States by six years imprisonment (*Criminal Code*, paragraphs 4 and 6). The conspiracy section of the Espionage act, to which Corwin refers, punishes the slighter offenses of conspiracy to obstruct enlistment, etc., through speeches and publications, by imprisonment for twenty years.

Has not the value gone out of Marshall's opinion since Congress has now allowed the courts to convict for such conduct as Burr was charged with, without two witnesses? No; because the new offenses are not punishable, like treason, by forfeiture and death. Regardless of the correctness of his decision on the technical point, his rigidity in the Burr trial set the precedent for a strict construction of treason, which even in the excitement of the late war was always preserved in trials for that crime. The attitude of judges in the few and abortive treason prosecutions of recent years is in marked contrast to the loose interpretation which they gave to the Espionage act and to the broad construction of treason by the House of Representatives in the *Berger* case. It may be conjectured that except for Marshall's firmness, many opponents of the late war would have been tried for treason under the old English precedents and convicted, and that death sentences would have been inflicted by the judges who made

such generous use of the maximum penalty of the Espionage act.

One may also take issue with Professor Corwin's comment upon *McCulloch vs. Maryland* (page 143), that the Supreme Court in construing state legislation looks at the facts, i. e. its substantial effect in operation, and invalidates the law if the legislative power is abused; but that in construing congressional legislation it is more liberal and follows Marshall's "bolder method," holding that "where power exists to any degree or for any purpose, it exists to every degree and for every purpose." Does not any difference in result arise from the fact that Congress has no powers but those expressly given, whereas state legislatures have all powers except those expressly taken away, so that the inquiry as to state legislation is usually focussed upon the alleged limitation, and with federal legislation upon the question whether the power exists? In the comparatively few cases which involve limitations imposed by the Constitution on powers granted to Congress, is the Court more favorable to Congress than when it construes limitations upon the states? Would "due process of law" be applied more gingerly to invalidate a statute forbidding employers to discharge workmen for joining a union, if it was federal legislation under the fifth amendment than if it was state legislation under the fourteenth amendment? (Compare *Adair vs. U. S.*, 208 U. S. 161 and *Coppage vs. Kansas*, 236 U. S. 1.)

It is interesting that J. B. Thayer also made a distinction in the attitude of the Supreme Court toward Congress and the legislatures, but very different from Professor Corwin's. Thayer held that the Court should be very slow to invalidate acts of Congress, because it was a coordinate branch of the government, but could have a much freer scope with state legislatures, because they are inferior bodies. Both Corwin's and Thayer's distinctions may be questioned. First, such discrimination seems unneutral in a tribunal established to settle burning controversies between the nation and a sovereign state. Secondly, it seems inconceivable that any group of judges could consciously keep two inconsistent theories of constitutional interpretation operating side by side without falling into hopeless confusion.

Similar problems of the relation between nation and states have arisen in Australia, where their Supreme Court has followed *McCulloch vs. Maryland* and held that Victoria could not levy an income tax on the salary of a postmaster employed by the Commonwealth. One would very much like to have Corwin's opinion of the arguments against this phase of Marshall's decision advanced by Justice Higgins, formerly head of the Court of Conciliation (18 *Harvard Law Review* 559), that a tax which rests as lightly on a federal salary as on similar income from other sources is valid, and that it is time enough to raise the proposition that the power to tax is the power to destroy when obstruction of a federal agency is actually threatened in a concrete situation. Marshall's decision has undoubtedly landed us in many difficulties. It has led logically to the converse proposition that the United States cannot tax state instrumentalities, such as the income from state or municipal bonds, and thus brought about the present exodus of capital into such securities when it is badly needed in private enterprise, with a resultant haphazard distribution of the burdens of war taxation. A further complication is created by the embarkation of the federal government into merchant shipping and

the states into liquor, banking, and grain elevators. If Marshall's reasoning applies, each sovereignty is able to withdraw large amounts of hitherto taxable business out of the reach of the other sovereignty. Realizing this danger, the Supreme Court refused to allow the liquor business in South Carolina to escape the internal revenue officers when it was taken over by the state dispensaries. Will it similarly hold that coupons from North Dakota bonds issued to take over grain elevators are subject to the federal income tax? And can they be distinguished from bonds issued by New York City for its water business? No opinion is ventured, except that we are in a tangle. Similarly, Marshall's decision in *Brown vs. Maryland* that goods arriving in a state from outside were exempt from state taxation or regulation so long as they remained in the original package, paralyzed the efforts of dry states to keep liquor out, and forced prohibition to become a national issue.

Corwin gives a helpful explanation of this absolutistic conception of national powers in fields where some scope for local action was practically desirable (page 229):

The Constitution was established under the sway of the idea of the balance of power. . . . The nation and the states were regarded as competitive forces, and a condition of tension between them was thought to be not only normal but desirable. The modern point of view is very different. Local differences have to a great extent disappeared, and that general interest, which is the same for all the states is an ever deepening one. The idea of the competition of the states with the nation is yielding to that of their cooperation in public service.

Although our present governmental machinery is satisfactory to secure this cooperation between a state and the nation, a serious and little discussed difficulty is the absence of machinery to enable the states to cooperate with one another. Nothing in the Constitution prevents Massachusetts from taxing New Jersey bonds, though the United States cannot. This typifies the odd situation of forty-eight partially sovereign states regulating economic forces whose natural operation disregards state lines. The inability of the six New England states to adopt a uniform railroad policy; the obstacles to interstate rendition of deserting husbands; the want of reciprocity between states as to automobile licenses; the duplication and triplication of state inheritance taxes on the same securities, when justice and a healthy attitude toward fresh capital require the levy of a single tax, which should be distributed among the states concerned in a ratio roughly based on their respective interests; the conflicting decisions of state courts on commercial matters, even in their interpretation of the same section of a Uniform Law: all these problems of increasing gravity may have to be met by some new form of control from Washington, unless happily they can be solved by agreement among the states themselves, perhaps under the little-used clause of the Constitution which permits compacts between the states when Congress consents. Even though Marshall's doctrine of national supremacy went far at times, perhaps it was unavoidable in order to reduce to a minimum the possibility of similar frictions between state and nation.

Such are a few of the problems in our system of government which are raised by Marshall's career, as presented in Professor Corwin's interesting book.

ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.

A Monk of Theleme

Decadence and Other Essays on the Culture of Ideas, by Remy de Gourmont; authorized translation by William Aspenwall Bradley. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. \$2.00.

NIETZSCHE, according to G. B. S., was the first of them to discover that philosophers had got to take to the craft and the practice of journalism; if they would be read they would have to write editorials, paragraphs and headlines, and leave long expositions to the mere makers of books. Remy de Gourmont made the same discovery. He is not a headline artist as Nietzsche was, but he is eminently an editorial writer and paragraphist. He does not set out to make a book. "What good is it for me to pretend, for example," he asks, "that these miscellaneous articles are closely bound together by a common idea? Doubtless some of them hang together fairly well, and seem even to grow one out of the other; but, in its ensemble, the book is merely a collection of articles (he is speaking of *La Culture des Idées*). When Voltaire wanted to give his opinion on a current topic, he published a pamphlet. We, today, publish an article in a review or a journal. But Voltaire, at the end of the year, did not gather his various pamphlets into a volume. He let them follow their destiny separately. They were collected only in his complete works, where, then, it was possible, grouping them according to their affinities, to avoid that variegated air necessarily assumed by our collection of articles."

It has to be said for the collection of essays that Mr. Aspenwall Bradley has translated and published in a volume of the European Library, that they hang together very well indeed. It is not an idea that gives them unity; it is a method rather. That method is uniquely Remy de Gourmont's. It is the division of the "commonplace" as the translator calls it, or the truism, into its two factors—the fact and the abstraction that has been coupled with the fact. This method Remy de Gourmont speaks of as the disassociation of ideas; the essay that is a direct exposition of the method is the key to all his statements, and, very properly, it is given the first place in the first considerable version in English of Remy de Gourmont's thought.

Nowadays we need only to be reminded that man does not make a statement in accordance with verifiable exactitude, but in accordance with his pleasure and interest. His commonplaces then (the fact and the abstraction coupled) do not represent eternal verities. Among such commonplaces are crime-remorse, virtue-recompense, vice-punishment, duty-happiness, authority-respect, duty-progress. These are among the hundreds of thousands of commonplaces that philosophers have to break up as the chemist resolves certain substances.

And what of the most dangerous commonplace of all—the commonplace that is represented by nationality-force? Remy de Gourmont has hardly alluded to it, but it is the commonplace that today bestrides the whole of man's world. Nothing can be done by congresses or conferences until the psychological operation has taken place, until the fact and the abstraction have been divided one from the other. When we have read Remy de Gourmont we know that such disassociation precedes every great liberation of humanity.

Ultimately this philosopher offers us an association, which, as it seems to him, will make for a great liberation

—it is the association death-nothingness. "Humanity insists upon considering them separately. It opposes their union with all its force, never tiring of driving between them a chimerical wedge upon which resound the hammer-blows of hope." Perhaps. But Remy de Gourmont is not more forceful than other philosophers when he writes upon the idea of immortality. He is really unsophisticated when he plots out the rise of the idea of personal immortality—unsophisticated as all philosophers are when they strive to put into precise terms someone else's guesses as to riddle of savage thought.

The portrait that is prefixed to the collection of essays is rich in suggestiveness. One cannot help seeing the monk in this man. Then one is intrigued into seeing in him the reincarnation of the one whose bold disassociation of certain commonplaces made such a scandal nine hundred years ago—the Breton Abelard. This portrait shows us one who belongs, not to society, but to an order; one who is removed from the world, but who knows the world's secrets; one to whom the beauty and the power of the world might come for counsel. And yet, what dramatic confrontations would be suggested if we actually met in the cloisters one with such a look as this! The mouth with its protuberant lips has as much personal history as the whole of another man's face; the eyes that are wide but not limpid have brows that are at a satanic angle. The forehead is dominating, the nose is salient. No rule could mitigate the irony and the sensuality that is in this face.

We see him in a monastery, but it would have to be a unique monastery—it would have to be the monastery that Rabelais projected in the Abbey of Theleme. Only the wisest men and the most beautiful women would be permitted to enter, and the rule they should live under would be "Do as thou wilt." That Abbey would have access to the laboratories. A philosophy would be taught that would not be a rationalization of our interests and desires, but would be "merely a commentary on life, but on life as a whole." We would be taught that our senses are not prior to our external environment, that we judge this external environment uniquely, and that "Idealism means materialism, and conversely, materialism means idealism." Mediaevalism would be shattered by the abolition of a duality—the duality of body and soul. "Man separated from the rest of nature is a pure mystery. To understand something of our own constitution we must plunge ourselves humbly into the vital milieu whence religious pride has withdrawn us in order to raise us to the dignity of jumping jacks of the ideal." We would be shown that in every work of art sex is implicit—as an overtone if not as a direct appeal.

There are two writers of English that Remy de Gourmont's essays will recall—two writers who are each far apart; one is George Santayana and the other is Havelock Ellis. Like Santayana, de Gourmont dislikes the Teutonic authoritativeness that is Protestantism, and he thinks that its triumph, or the triumph of the secular interests that it has given rise to over Mediterranean Catholicism would be a disaster for the European spirit. But his Catholicism would be even more dessicated than Santayana's—it would simply represent the continuity of the European life that has its roots in Greece and Rome. And what de Gourmont has to say about our naïve conception of justice is close to what Santayana has been saying on the same topic in one of his recent essays. But unlike Santayana's temperate statements, there is in all that de Gourmont writes

a tropical glow—an overtone of sensuality. Like Havelock Ellis he judges life, conduct and history from an awareness of scientific achievement. And, like the writer of *The Psychology of Sex* the writer of *La Physique de l'Amour* believes in "situating" a great part of human life in "the vital milieu" of universal sexuality.

Whether he writes apropos of Glory and the Idea of Immortality, or Success and the Idea of Beauty, or The Value of Education, or Women and Language, or Stéphane Mallarmé and the Idea of Decadence, or Style in Writing, or Subconscious Creation, or *The Roots of Idealism*, the method he uses is that of disassociation of ideas. A great victory for the human spirit is achieved, he shows us, when a fact is liberated from the abstraction that has been coupled with it. In our time art has been liberated from the abstractions of utility, morality, education. Far back in history the Greeks separated woman from the idea of generation; before that they had separated the idea of generation and of carnal pleasure. But in the domain of love the greatest advance has been made by Christianity—the separation of the idea of love and of carnal pleasure. This represented one of the great conquests of humanity. "What has been clumsily called Platonic love is thus a Christian creation."

Whither do all such disassociations of human ideas tend? Towards an end that came in sight when the separation of love and carnal pleasure was achieved—to asceticism. "The ideal state of human affections is the first stage on the road to asceticism, and asceticism might be defined as a state of mind in which all ideas are disassociated." Asceticism! when the word is pronounced we see that Theleme and La Trappe are not so far apart after all!

PADRAIC COLUM.

The Age of Invention

The Age of Invention: A Chronicle of Mechanical Conquest, by Holland Thompson. Vol. 37; *The Chronicles of America Series*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

The Control of Life, by J. Arthur Thomson, M. A., LL. D. New York: Henry Holt & Co. \$2.50.

THE Age of Invention is a chronicle in the narrow sense of the word. It does little more than describe in detail the succession of American mechanical ingenuities which began with the lightning rod and the Franklin stove and went onward through the cotton gin and the sewing machine to the phonograph, the typewriter, and the airplane. These are facts whose nature and occurrence are familiar to even the semi-educated; and Mr. Holland Thompson makes no attempt to interpret them. He does not point out what a new departure they are in western civilization; he does not explain the peculiar position America has occupied from the beginning in the mechanization of the western world; he does not even trace out the more obvious consequences of our technical advances upon the distribution of population, the exploitation of foreign territories, and so forth. In short, the significance of the Age of Invention to the development of our American civility is lost in a shuffle of dates, biographies, and anecdotes.

I have coupled Mr. Thompson's chronicle with Professor J. Arthur Thomson's *The Control of Life*, for the reason that the first writer deals implicitly with the physical aspect of a problem that Professor Thomson

drives at mainly from the biological side. What instruments can we use for the "relief of man's estate"? Professor Thomson begins with the Baconian thesis that science is the chief instrument for this purpose, and he attempts to show in terms of present day biological knowledge the possibilities for development that now open before us. On the subjects of heredity, health, and population, Professor Thomson indicates that a good store of knowledge is already available for rectifying the tendencies toward deterioration which are so plain in the modern community. Yet at the conclusion of his excellent survey the central thesis of *The Control of Life*—"that a new freedom may be reached by bringing more brains, as well as more goodwill, to bear"—is insidiously withdrawn. "The application of science," Professor Thomson confesses, "need not be for good at all; the degree to which it will be for good depends on its congruence with man's organization of ideals. . . . There is obviously nothing evil in machinery or mining as such; there can be nothing evil in applying science to industry; but the danger of our weak humanity is in allowing practical organization to be dominated by some one-sided ideal such as greed. And, as has been shrewdly said, the reason for the ugliness of the nineteenth century factory and railway station and 'tenement' was the ideal-system of those who built them."

Now, the outstanding feature of the Age of Invention was its concentration upon the external environment. Even in its attempt to improve human institutions—and the age of invention abounded with a multitude of proposals, like those brought before the Mudfog Association, "for the advancement of everything"—stress was laid upon fool-proof mechanical devices which could be constructed without altering the nature of the people who were going to work them, and without changing the ideal-systems these people might possess. It would be interesting to catalogue side by side the various mechanical and social devices upon which the Age of Invention based its hope for a new world. At the time that Watt was inventing the steam engine, Bentham was drawing up those coda of constitutional reform which he fairly expected to be the pillars of his immortality; and perhaps the parallel could be carried further. In one column would be the power loom, the steam engine, the electric telegraph; in the other, manhood suffrage, the joint stock company, the eight-hour working day. I do not suggest that any of these inventions are despicable, or that a civil community would be willing to forfeit a single one. What seems to me significant, however, is that our social and mechanical inventions have still left unanswered the central problem in the control of life—what is to control the controller? This looks like a question of ideology rather than technology; and it is still, perhaps, worth discussing.

By themselves, knowledge and invention leave a human being in exactly the same pickle in which he has been discovered, again and again, by all the great ideologists from Zarathustra to Plato, and from St. Augustine to Nietzsche. Our present existence may be described as a great incontinence of means and a perpetual abortion of ends. The fact that we have split life into two departments, the ideal and the practical, the spiritual and the temporal, is not a proof that the respect for the ideal is a cynical hypocrisy but that we have lacked, and still lack, a method of integration. One of the reasons for this failure has lain in the fact that our instrumentalities have been concerned chiefly with "things," and our ideolo-

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gies with men; and we have been negligent of the necessity for developing a technique which could be applied to human behavior itself. Here indeed is the predicament. The Age of Invention contented itself with developing a monumental apparatus for controlling the outer life; while the small array of devices that existed for controlling the inner life, and disciplining the personality, remained largely in the hands of deliberate quacks or irrelevant mystics—the Pelmans and the Swedenborgs.

There is a legitimate challenge to genuine science and philosophy in the personality cults, the theosophists and the Christian Scientists, that have sprung up in recent years. It is possible that these systems have something to teach us about methods of handling the human psyche and developing its powers, even though the foundation of their methods may be scientifically absurd. In response to the genuine needs which these mystic cults attempt to satisfy, let science and philosophy undertake a scrupulous examination of every formulary for conduct, from the Bhagavad Gita down to Mrs. Eddy. Let us criticize this body of data in the light of physiology and analytical psychology; and then let us see what is available for immediate consumption. Doubtless the older ideologies have been unwise in that their demands upon Falstaff and Pistol to live like Christ have kept these biological rascallions from achieving so much as the level of Robin Hood. It is evident, however, that we have been equally stupid in putting into control of our modern political and industrial organizations men who are ruthlessly ignorant of humane ideals, who are obtuse to the needs of the personality, and who are ridiculously undisciplined to conduct which demands so much as a cubit's reach above the instinctive level. In sum, the Age of Invention awaits in its attempt to control life for a discipline which shall control the controller, and for an ideology which will place before the controllers humanly valuable ends. Lacking this, the Age of Invention will probably turn out to be an age of sodden dissipation; and woe to the generation that awakens to the dawn of the morning after!

LEWIS MUMFORD.

Beauty and Mary Blair

Beauty and Mary Blair, by Ethel M. Kelly. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. \$2.00.

THOUGH the flapper heroine of *Beauty and Mary Blair* presents her own problems and comments on her family and friends with most engaging cleverness, one feels her to be less an individual than a significant type of modern girlhood. Her observations are both tragic and amusing. They make real the bleak disillusionments and the rainbow color of questing youth, as well as the stupidity of elders in forgetting or overlooking the youthful point of view. Mary's own freedom of conduct seems shockingly indelicate to the philandering parents by whom she has been perplexed and saddened. Yet compared with them she is courageously consistent and tolerant. A hard thing to accept is this mature tolerance. Youth is not given to such. Yet it may be a logical development in the sophistication of the modern young woman, a maternal patience prematurely forced by her broader knowledge. The Blair family is admirably etched, with well-poised irony for the inconsistencies of both conservatives and radicals. But the caddish young Chase who blackens Mary's world for a

time is more convincing than the knight-like lover who appears opportunely to teach her that beauty is love, love beauty. On the whole, however, it is a wise young book.

ROSE HENDERSON.

Selected Current Books

The Immigrant Press, and its Control, by Robert E. Park. Macmillan. \$2.00.

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Fyodor Dostoyevsky, by Aimée Dostoyevsky. Yale University Press. \$4.00.

An interpretation of Dostoyevsky by his daughter.

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Contributors

DAVID FRIDAY was until recently professor of economics at the University of Michigan. He is the author of *Profits, Wages and Prices* and of various articles on financial subjects.

BRUCE BLIVEN is associate editor of the *New York Globe*.

H. N. BRAILSFORD, the English publicist, is the author of *Across the Border and Russian Impressions*.

HEBER BLANKENHORN is a member of the Bureau of Industrial Research, New York City.

GEORGE GLASGOW is one of the editors of the *New Europe*.

LOUIS UNTERMAYER is a frequent contributor of verse and critiques to the *New Republic*. Among his books of poetry are *Including Horace*, *Challenge* and a translation of the *Poems of Heinrich Heine*. He is the editor of *Modern American Poetry* and of *Modern British Poetry*.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., is a professor at the Harvard Law School and the author of *Freedom of Speech*.

PADRAIC COLUM is the Irish poet, author and reviewer. Among his recent books are *Children of Odin*, and *The Children's Homer*.

LEWIS MUMFORD has been associate editor of the *Dial* and acting editor of the (London) *Sociological Review*.